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I.  INTRODUCTION 
For the last fourteen years, the Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) and many states have structured their civil and criminal Clean Air 
Act (CAA) asbestos enforcement programs upon a bulk material test 
method that has never been promulgated into law through administrative 
rulemaking.  In so doing, the federal and state governments disregard the 
only bulk material test method for asbestos content enumerated by law 
for CAA compliance.  The particular test method used in an enforcement 
proceeding is highly consequential: it effectively defines the universe of 
material that is subject to regulation under the asbestos National 
Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants (asbestos NESHAP).T1
Changing the asbestos NESHAP’s test method, as the EPA did 
informally in 1993, alters the jurisdictional reach of the regulation 
 1. The EPA regulates the emissions of air toxics, such as asbestos, through a 
series of National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAPs) 
promulgated under the 1990 amendments to the CAA.  See 40 C.F.R. pts. 61, 63 (2006).  
The EPA’s regulation to limit significant asbestos fiber releases during demolition and 
renovation projects is known as the “asbestos NESHAP.”  40 C.F.R. §§ 61.140–.157 
(2006). 
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immediately; that is, certain formerly lawful conduct becomes instantly 
unlawful.  At least two courts—one federal district court and one state 
appellate court—concluded almost simultaneously in 2006 that the EPA’s 
asbestos NESHAP enforcement program, to the extent it is predicated 
upon nonbinding test methods, raises profound administrative law and 
constitutional due process complications. 
The legal analysis starts with two basic facts.  First, there is one test 
method mandated by law for quantifying a material’s asbestos content 
for purposes of the asbestos NESHAP, a method which is incorporated 
into the very definition of “friable asbestos material” and “regulated 
asbestos-containing material” (RACM).2  Second, that test method was 
promulgated into law by the EPA as part of the 1990 amendments to the 
asbestos NESHAP and has remained on the books without modification 
ever since (“1990 test method”).3
In 1993, however, the EPA made a policy choice to disregard the one 
and only asbestos test method mandated by law in favor of a new test.  
The EPA concluded within only a few years of adoption of the 1990 
test method that the test was deficient, especially with respect to 
multilayered systems.  The EPA effectively rewrote the 1990 test method 
through a series of “clarifications,” coupled with widespread circulation 
of a preferred test method in 1993 (“1993 test method”).  The EPA took 
no legal steps whatsoever either to rescind or supersede the 1990 test 
method. 
The due process implications of the EPA’s 1993 policy decision to 
switch tests finally coalesced in 2006 in separate criminal and civil 
proceedings.  Due process instructs that criminal prosecutions rest upon 
statutes and promulgated regulations only, not on agency “policy” or 
discretionary test methods that have never been adopted into law.  This 
maxim is especially applicable where an agency does not purport simply 
to interpret an existing regulation, but instead to replace the promulgated 
 2. See 40 C.F.R. § 61.141 (2006) (defining “friable asbestos material” and 
“nonfriable asbestos-containing material”). 
 3. See National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants; Asbestos 
NESHAP Revision, 55 Fed. Reg. 48,406 (Nov. 20, 1990).  The 1990 test method 
incorporates by reference U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, INTERIM METHOD FOR THE 
DETERMINATION OF ASBESTOS IN BULK INSULATION SAMPLES (1982), which was 
previously codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 763, subpt. E, app. E  (2006) in 1987 as Title II of 
the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) and the asbestos program for schools 
implemented by the Asbestos Hazard Emergency Response Act of 1986 (AHERA), Pub. 
L. No. 99-519, 10 Stat. 2970 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 




regulatory definitions and test method.4  To be enforceable, such a 
change in the governing regulation must be accomplished through CAA 
rulemaking with public participation and judicial review.  In fact, the 
CAA specifically mandates that all NESHAP test methods must be 
developed and promulgated through the rulemaking procedures set forth 
in the statute itself.5  Applying this irreducible constitutional principle to 
the EPA’s asbestos NESHAP enforcement program, the EPA (and 
delegated states) continues to openly defy basic constitutional safeguards 
by prosecuting companies and individuals based upon the weight and 
findings of a nonbinding asbestos test method. 
Two cases of first impression, decided within one month of each other 
in 2006, vindicate the long-standing due process principle that no 
prosecution can lie where the government relies upon the findings of 
nonbinding test methods that have never been subjected to rulemaking.  
In January 2006, the federal government indicted San Diego Gas & 
Electric Company (SDG&E) for the first time in its 125-year history, 
two employees, and an outside contractor for the removal of multilayered, 
coal tar pipe coating by licensed and qualified asbestos abatement 
subcontractors.6  None of the project’s asbestos abatement contractors 
was indicted—only the property owner, two employees, and the project’s 
general contractor.  In United States v. San Diego Gas & Electric, there 
was no dispute that the removal project was entirely lawful if the 
quantity of asbestos in the pipe coating material was one percent or less.  
Stated differently, unless the quantity of asbestos in the multilayered 
SDG&E pipe coating material exceeded the one percent jurisdictional 
 4. Not even the Administrator’s interpretations of his own regulations can  
cure an omission or add certainty and definiteness to otherwise vague language.  
The prohibited conduct must, for criminal purposes, be set forth with clarity in 
the regulations and orders which he is authorized by Congress to promulgate 
under the Act . . . .  And certainly a criminal conviction ought not to rest upon 
an interpretation reached by the use of policy judgments rather than by the 
inexorable command of relevant language. 
M. Kraus & Bros. v. United States, 327 U.S. 614, 622, 626 (1946) (reversing conviction 
under World War II commodity price regulation). 
[T]he responsibility to promulgate clear and unambiguous standards is on the 
[agency].  The test is not what [the agency] might possibly have intended, but 
what [was] said.  If the language is faulty, the [agency] had the means and 
obligation to amend.  Thus, reliance on policies underlying a statute cannot be 
treated as a substitute for the agency’s duty to promulgate clear and definitive 
regulations. 
United States v. Trident Seafoods Corp., 60 F.3d 556, 559 (9th Cir. 1995) (vacating civil 
asbestos NESHAP penalty) (alteration in original) (citations omitted). 
 5. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7412(b)(5), 7607(d) (2000). 
 6. Indictment, United States v. San Diego Gas & Elec., No. 06CR0065 DMS 
(S.D. Cal. Jan. 11, 2006). 
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threshold to become “regulated asbestos-containing material,” or RACM, 
the asbestos NESHAP and its “work practices” did not apply at all. 
In July 2003, the State of Wisconsin filed suit seeking to impose 
substantial civil penalties on a licensed asbestos abatement contractor for 
the removal of multilayered, asbestos-containing wall systems in the 
Milwaukee Auditorium under a delegated state asbestos program identical 
to the federal asbestos NESHAP program.7  In 2005, the trial court granted 
summary judgment in favor of the State, but the court of appeals reversed in 
October 2006 on the ground that the State cannot impose liability based 
on a nonbinding test method.8  In State of Wisconsin v. Harenda 
Enterprises, there was no dispute that depending upon the test method 
used, the asbestos content of the multilayered wall system at issue either 
exceeded or fell below the one percent jurisdictional threshold for the 
NESHAP work practices to apply.  The State conceded that if the 1990 
test method is used, the Milwaukee Auditorium wall system is not 
regulated.  Contrary to the EPA’s position in the federal SDG&E case, 
Wisconsin argued, and the trial court agreed, that the 1990 test method is 
“not clear,” which the trial court believed opened the door to examine 
two EPA clarifications purporting to adopt the 1993 test method.9
The crux of the EPA’s and Wisconsin’s constitutional dilemma is that 
the 1990 test method, incorporated directly into core definitions of the 
asbestos regulation, operates to draw a bright, jurisdictional dividing line 
between lawful and unlawful activity.  Changing the test method moves 
that line, with dramatic consequences to individuals and corporations 
who are charged with violating the asbestos NESHAP.  The 1990 test 
method upon which asbestos-containing material and RACM are 
explicitly defined calculates asbestos content based upon the average of 
all layers of multilayered material.  The nonbinding 1993 test method 
 7. Civil Complaint, State v. Wis. Ctr. Dist., 724 N.W.2d 434 (Wis. Ct. App. 
2006) (Unclassified Civil No. 30703); State v. Harenda Enters., Inc., 724 N.W.2d 434 
(Wis. Ct. App. 2006), rev. granted, 732 N.W.2d 857 (Wis. 2007); Brief of Plaintiff-
Respondent at 20, State v. Harenda Enters., Inc., 724 N.W.2d 434 (Wis. Ct. App. 2006) 
(No. 2005AP1829). 
 8. Harenda, 724 N.W.2d at 439. 
 9. See Brief of Plaintiff-Respondent, supra note 7, at 3–8 (quoting trial court’s 
analysis).  In SDG&E, the government argued that the “EPA need not have complied 
with rulemaking procedures because the single-layer test method is merely a ‘clarification’ of 
the averaging test method.”  Order Granting Motion to Dismiss Counts 1, 2, 3 and 5 of 
the Indictment for Failure to State an Offense Involving Jurisdictional Amount of “Regulated” 
Asbestos-Containing Material at 7:17–19, United States v. San Diego Gas & Elec., No. 
06CR0065 DMS (S.D. Cal. Nov. 21, 2006). 




does not.  The nonbinding test method upon which both the SDG&E and 
Harenda Enterprises cases are based asks the much narrower question of 
whether any single layer (or any portion thereof) exceeds one percent 
asbestos, in which event the “entire material is deemed to be regulated 
asbestos containing material.”10  By definition, the 1993 test method therefore 
reports artificially high concentrations of asbestos for multilayered 
material and positively identifies certain material as “regulated” material 
that would not exceed the law’s jurisdictional threshold under the 1990 
test method. 
The federal court in SDG&E concluded in November 2006 that the 
indictment was fatally defective because the government’s theory of 
prosecution effectively rewrote the regulation without rulemaking.11  
The court dismissed all asbestos NESHAP counts of the indictment.12  
SDG&E also noted that if the government was allowed to prosecute five 
to six years after project completion and in the absence of any intact 
multilayered coating material, the defendants would be deprived of the 
ability to vindicate themselves using the only scientific test method 
authorized by law to demonstrate that their conduct was lawful during 
active subcontractor removal operations in 2000 and 2001.13
SDG&E and Harenda Enterprises exposed the widening gulf between 
the EPA policy in 2006 and the binding NESHAP jurisdictional 1990 
test method.  The EPA favors the newer and nonbinding 1993 test method 
because the promulgated 1990 test method excludes material that the 
EPA now believes ought to be, but is not, regulated.  Under well-settled 
due process principles and interpretative canons of strict regulatory 
construction in criminal cases, if the literal language of the asbestos 
NESHAP and its enumerated test method is faulty in the EPA’s view, it 
has the “means and obligation to amend” that regulation before sanctions 
are available to the government.14  The government cannot unilaterally 
 10. See Government Bill of Particulars at 9:18–22, United States v. San Diego Gas 
& Elec., No. 06CR0065 DMS (S.D. Cal. Oct. 18, 2006). 
 11. Order Granting Motion to Dismiss, supra note 9, at 9–13.  The government 
obtained a second indictment on February 27, 2007, describing the court’s dismissal of 
the first indictment as a quarrel with the proper language.  SDG&E, 3 Workers Are 
Indicted Again, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Feb. 28, 2007, at B3. 
 12. Order Granting Motion to Dismiss, supra note 9, at 17.  The Government 
reindicted on February 27, 2007 under the theory that it has now been able to perform 
the appropriate testing set forth in the asbestos NESHAP.  Indictment, United States v. 
San Diego Gas & Elec., No. 07CR0484 DMS (S.D. Cal. Feb. 27, 2007). 
 13. Order Granting Motion to Dismiss, supra note 9, at 5:5–9. 
 14. See Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Occupational Safety & Health Rev. Comm’n, 
573 F.2d 157, 161 (3d Cir. 1978) (invalidating order finding OSHA safety work practice 
violation, stating, “The responsibility to promulgate clear and unambiguous standards is 
upon the Secretary.  The test is not what he might possibly have intended, but what he 
said.  If the language is faulty, the Secretary has the means and the obligation to amend.”). 
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disregard RACM’s definition and the asbestos NESHAP’s enumerated, 
jurisdictional test method, both elements of a NESHAP crime, as “words 
of no consequence”15 and develop instead common law test methods and 
crimes.  Because the 1990 test method applies equally to the TSCA schools 
program and asbestos testing in schools and public buildings under the 
Asbestos Hazard Emergency Response Act of 1986 (AHERA) and its 
regulations,16 the due process lessons drawn from SDG&E and Harenda 
Enterprises apply with equal force to other enforcement programs as well. 
By the EPA’s own admission, the differences between the nonbinding 
1993 and the promulgated 1990 test methods are substantive and not 
interpretative.  The EPA concedes in the introduction of the 1993 test 
method that it “contains significant revisions” to the enumerated 1990 test 
method and adds “new procedures” that expand the universe of regulated 
material.17  Upon promulgating the 1990 test method as part of the 1990 
amendments to the asbestos NESHAP, the EPA admitted that it would 
have to undergo CAA rulemaking and judicial review if it wanted to 
amend the regulation’s test method at any time in the future.18  Indeed, 
the EPA went so far as to commit in 1995 to “amend the asbestos 
NESHAP in the near future” to make the 1993 test method new law.19  It 
has never done so.  In the absence of EPA rulemaking to modify the 
definition of RACM and the NESHAP’s enumerated test method, seven 
states have felt compelled in the last ten years to adopt the 1993 test method 
into their respective state asbestos regulations, one on an “emergency” 
basis in June 2006.20
Taken together, SDG&E and Harenda Enterprises address important 
due process issues of first impression under the CAA and AHERA.  
These are the first test cases since the 1973 promulgation of the asbestos 
 15. Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 140, 149 (1994) (reversing conviction 
where element of crime treated as surplusage). 
 16. Asbestos Hazard Emergency Response Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-519, 10 
Stat. 2970 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.); see also the promulgated 
AHERA regulations at 40 C.F.R. pt. 763 (2006). 
 17. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA/600/R-93/116, METHOD FOR THE DETERMINATION 
OF ASBESTOS IN BULK BUILDING MATERIALS 1 (1993). 
 18. EMISSIONS STANDARDS DIVISION, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA-450/3-90-
017, NATIONAL EMISSION STANDARDS FOR ASBESTOS—BACKGROUND INFORMATION FOR 
PROMULGATED ASBESTOS NESHAP REVISIONS 4-16 (1990). 
 19. Asbestos NESHAP Clarification Regarding Analysis of Multi-Layered 
Systems, 60 Fed. Reg. 65,243 (Dec. 19, 1995). 
 20. See infra notes 38–40 and accompanying text; see also Testing of Bulk Material 
Samples, 38 N.J. Reg. 2526-29 (June 5, 2006). 




NESHAP work practices regulation to address whether the government 
can demonstrate material is “regulated” under the asbestos NESHAP for 
purposes of imposing penal sanctions on the weight of a discretionary 
agency test method of choice.21  Paradoxically, in SDG&E, the government 
elected to test its pioneering reinterpretation of the NESHAP and 
RACM’s definition at the expense and potential freedom of individuals, 
and even in the face of hundreds of contemporaneous project-specific air 
and soil data demonstrating no releases of asbestos fibers whatsoever 
during the (licensed subcontractor) removal operations.  It was a form-
over-substance prosecution. 
The government’s criminal and civil application of a nonbinding test 
method in substitution of the enumerated test effectively rewrites the law 
and confers upon the government arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement 
power.  It would effectively create a common law crime, which due 
process principles of fair warning and lenity forbid.  Under the 1993 test 
method, or any other nonbinding test method of choice, the government 
could systematically thin or physically alter any multi- or single-layered 
material to a sufficient pinch, slice, or dimension to push nonregulated 
material over to the criminal side of the jurisdictional dividing line. 
“[A] criminal prosecution is not the place to decide pioneering 
interpretations of the law.”22  Nor is the purpose of criminal law to 
“penalize frank differences of opinion”23 or settle an unresolved battle of 
 21. There are well over 100 published and unpublished civil and criminal asbestos 
NESHAP cases.  The vast majority are civil disputes regarding above-ground building 
materials where the jurisdictional application of the NESHAP regulation to the particular 
material at issue has never been disputed.  Most cases postdate the 1990 NESHAP 
amendments and involve common denominators such as dry removal of above-ground 
building materials, unlicensed workers, failure to notify, or improper disposal or 
abandonment of waste at unlicensed facilities.  One administrative EPA Environmental 
Appeals Board decision concluded that the 1993 test method could support a $9160 
penalty based upon the weight of two post-1990 EPA clarifications purporting to 
disallow averaging for multilayered material under the 1990 test method.  See In re LVI 
Envtl. Servs., Inc., 10 E.A.D. 99, 106 (2001) (concluding Category I asphalt roofing 
material is regulated where any single layer is above 1%, even though asbestos content 
falls below 1% when all layers are averaged under the 1990 test method).  Both the 
SDG&E and Harenda Enterprises courts disregarded the EPA administrative law judge’s 
2001 opinion as having no persuasive or binding force. 
 22. United States v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 644 F. Supp. 1497, 1501 (C.D. Cal. 
1986), rev’d,  828 F.2d 1356 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing United States v. Critzer, 498 F.2d 
1160, 1164 (4th Cir. 1974) (reversing tax conviction where the Government was literally 
in dispute with itself over whether income at issue was taxable)) (finding indictment 
based on vague military contract, voluntarily dismissed later by Government). 
 23. See United States v. Dahlstrom, 713 F.2d 1423, 1428 (9th Cir. 1983) (stating 
legality of specific tax shelters which were subject of prosecution was “completely 
unsettled”). 
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the experts.24  Under no circumstances may the government criminalize 
otherwise lawful conduct that it purports crosses a jurisdictional dividing 
line based upon a “recommended” and nonbinding test method that 
disregards enumerated law.  Yet the EPA and various states continue to 
defy these constitutional safeguards to advance evolving policies and 
priorities of their respective CAA enforcement programs. 
II.  BACKGROUND OF THE ASBESTOS NESHAP TEST METHOD 
A.  Asbestos NESHAP 1990 Test Method 
To appreciate the dramatic and ongoing divergence of law and EPA 
policy, one must look at the asbestos NESHAP’s evolution and history.  
For the first seventeen years of the asbestos NESHAP’s existence 
(1973–1990), the asbestos content of material was measured on the basis 
of percentage weight, and no particular test method was enumerated by 
the regulation.  By 1990, the EPA had decided it was “long overdue” to 
adopt a specific test method to determine asbestos content to “reduce 
confusion over what activities are subject to the regulation.”25  The EPA 
initiated rulemaking to, among other things, clarify the regulation’s 
weight-based standard (with no test method) because the EPA had 
concluded that a one percent dry-weight standard tended to underestimate 
asbestos quantity in denser materials.26
Instead of developing an entirely new analytical test method to 
quantify asbestos for NESHAP purposes alone, the EPA incorporated a 
preexisting asbestos test method that had twice been through EPA 
rulemaking in 1982 and 1987 under different, non-CAA regulations.27  
That 1990 test method was incorporated into the very definition of 
“friable asbestos material” under the NESHAP and therefore is a fundamental 
 24. See Order at 7, United States v. W.R. Grace, 455 F. Supp. 2d 1122, 1128 (D. 
Mont. 2006) (No. CR 05-07-M-DWM), appeal docketed, No. 06-30472 (9th Cir. Sept. 5, 
2006) (rejecting prospect of allowing battling experts to define at trial whether particular 
forms of asbestos fibers are regulated by NESHAP). 
 25. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 18, at 4-8. 
 26. See National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants; Asbestos 
NESHAP Revision, 55 Fed. Reg. 48,406, 48,410 (Nov. 20, 1990) (noting that cement-
based fireproofing material containing unregulated amount of less than 1% asbestos by 
weight actually contains 30% asbestos by area). 
 27. See Interim Method for the Determination of Asbestos in Bulk Insulation 
Samples, 40 C.F.R. pt. 763, subpt. E, app. E (2006), which was incorporated into the 
EPA’s TSCA and AHERA programs. 




component of the definition of RACM.28  Unlike the nonbinding 1993 test 
method, the 1990 test method mandates a multistep analysis of all layers 
of the material to generate a composite or average asbestos percentage 
result for the material as a whole: 
Bulk samples of building materials taken for the identification and quantitation 
of asbestos are first examined for homogeneity. . . .  When discrete strata are 
identified, each is treated as a separate material so that fibers are first 
identified and quantified in that layer only, and then the results for each layer 
are combined to yield an estimate of asbestos content for the whole sample.29
Implicit within the “whole sample” concept set forth in the 1990 test 
method is the requirement to determine the average asbestos content 
based upon a weighted average of the multilayered system that accounts 
for the relative thicknesses of the individual layers.  Wisconsin argued in 
Harenda Enterprises that the 1990 test method must account for relative 
thicknesses of individual layers to avoid “absurd results.”30  The court of 
appeals noted that, absent averaging of the thickness of individual layers, 
absurd outcomes were possible, but it did not need to reach the question 
of whether the combination of the asbestos content of each separate 
layer “is done in reference to the mass, weight, or volume of each layer.  
Accordingly, we apply the one-percent threshold without further 
refinement . . . .”31  Likewise, the SDG&E court did not need to reach 
that issue to rule the indictment defective. 
B.  The EPA’s Nonbinding 1993 Test Method 
Within only a few years of the 1990 promulgation of the first and only 
asbestos NESHAP test method, the EPA concluded that the 1990 test 
method excluded certain multilayered materials from the definition of 
RACM.  Multilayered materials that ought to be regulated in the EPA’s 
view fell below the NESHAP’s one percent threshold under the literal 
application and averaging of the 1990 test method.  In 1993, the EPA 
therefore decided that a new asbestos test method was desirable.32
The 1993 test method promised “significant revisions” to the 1990 test 
method and “new procedures.”33  Included among the significant revisions 
 28. See 40 C.F.R. § 61.141 (2006). 
 29. 40 C.F.R. pt. 763, subpt. E, app. E § 1.7.2.1 (2006) (Gross Examination) 
(emphasis added). 
 30. State v. Harenda Enters., Inc., 724 N.W.2d 434, 439 n.4 (Wis. Ct. App. 2006), 
rev. granted, 732 N.W.2d 857 (Wis. 2007) (using example of multilayered wall made of 
twelve inches of styrofoam insulation covered by a quarter inch of plaster containing 5% 
asbestos). 
 31. Id. at 436 n.2. 
 32. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 17, at 1. 
 33. Id. 
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was an emphatic rejection of the multilayered averaging of asbestos content 
mandated by the 1990 test method.34  A comparison of the 1990 test 
method and the 1993 test method for multilayered material is set forth 
below. 
 
1990 Test Method (1990 
NESHAP Amendments) 
1993 Test Method 
(1993) 
Promulgated through CAA 
or non-CAA rulemaking (3 
times: 1982 TSCA, 1987 
AHERA, 1990 NESHAP). 
Never promulgated through 
rulemaking and not part of the 
definition of RACM. 
Multilayered analysis 
required. 
Only single-layer or sub-layer 
analysis recommended. 
Asbestos content based on 
average for all layers.  
Each layer of multilayered material 
separately analyzed and if any of the 
individual layers, standing alone, 
exceeds 1% asbestos, then entire 
multilayered material is deemed 
“regulated.”   
Laboratory makes no 
determination of friability of 
sample. 
Laboratory determines friability of 
sample based on broader non-
NESHAP definition set forth in 
Appendix A of 1993 test method, 
which is measured by the 
“disaggregation” of sample by 
laboratory instruments and analyst. 
 
 34. Id. at 6–7. 




More complete and accurate 
quantitation of asbestos 
fibers.  
Less accurate “visual area 
estimation” techniques.35
Intact and representative 
multilayered sample of 
original thickness required 
(all layers). 
No intact, representative, 
multilayered sample required; pipe 
wrap sample must be three to four 
square inches of layered material; 
anything less than fifteen grams 
considered “small quantity” bulk 
sample and subject to reliability 
precautions and rejection risk. 
 
By the EPA’s own admission, the “much improved”36 1993 test 
method substantially expands the universe of “regulated” material to 
include material not otherwise above the one percent threshold under the 
1990 test method. 
Because the [1990 test method] allowed the result to be reported as one number, 
multi-layered samples which may contain asbestos in a single layer may have 
been reported by laboratories as nonasbestos-containing.  The improved method 
directs laboratories to analyze and report a result for individual layers. . . .  [A] 
multi-layered sample which previously was determined to be nonasbestos-
containing may now have layers which will be classified as asbestos-containing 
based on the presence of asbestos in greater than 1 percent.37
Since 1990, and in the absence of federal rulemaking modifying the 
jurisdictional NESHAP test method, at least seven states have expressly 
adopted the 1993 test method in whole or in part into their respective 
 
 35. Experts describe visual estimation methods now favored by the EPA under the 
1993 test method as “significantly less accurate” than the techniques of the 1990 test 
method.  See Robert L. Perkins et al., The One Percent Dilemma, ENVTL. INFO. ASS’N J., 
Summer 1994, at 7, 10 (noting 92% of NVLAP-certified laboratories overestimated 
asbestos content of test samples because of human error, including one 60% result 
containing in actuality only 0.5% asbestos; NVLAP laboratory “overestimation of 
asbestos in bulk samples” is found to be “pervasive”); Robert L. Perkins, Point-Counting 
Technique for Friable Asbestos-Containing Materials, 38 MICROSCOPE, 1990, at 29, 
33–34 (stating visual estimation techniques “tend to be on the high side” and affected by 
“analyst bias” compared to 1990 test method techniques); James S. Webber et al., 
Quantitating Asbestos Content in Friable Bulk Samples: Development of a Stratified 
Point-Counting Method, 51 AM. INDUS. HYGIENE ASS’N J. 447, 447 (1990). 
 36. Letter from Michael E. Beard, EPA Atmospheric Research and Exposure 
Assessment Lab., to all Asbestos Analytical Laboratories (Sept. 7, 1993) (on file with 
authors).  
 37. Advisory Regarding Availability of an Improved Asbestos Bulk Sample Analysis 
Test Method, 59 Fed. Reg. 38,970, 38,971 (Aug. 1, 1994) (emphasis added). 
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state asbestos regulations.38  In 2002, for example, Texas enacted rules to 
disallow averaging under the 1990 test method for multilayered materials.39  
In 2006, New Jersey adopted the 1993 test method in substitution for the 
1990 test method in emergency rulemaking because New Jersey contractors 
were relying upon the literal language of the 1990 test method to exclude 
material as nonregulated to the dismay of state regulators.40
The EPA’s actions since it publicly distributed the 1993 test method to 
testing laboratories underscore that the test method has never been 
adopted into law and remains nonbinding: 
1. In September 1993, the EPA provided a courtesy notice of its 
“much improved” 1993 test method to all the asbestos analytical 
laboratories in the nation.41  The EPA acknowledged in its letter that 
the 1990 test method “remains the EPA compliance monitoring 
method and must be used for AHERA and NESHAP monitoring 
until further notice,” but the EPA stated the NESHAP test method’s 
longevity has been cast into serious doubt because “the agency is 
considering replacing the [1990 test method] with this newer, 
improved [1993 test method] procedure.”42
2. In January 1994, the EPA responded to “many questions” from 
industry regarding averaging of the asbestos content of multilayered 
material under the 1990 test method to determine whether the 
material is regulated.43  The EPA criticized ongoing averaging under 
the 1990 test method, with one exception—certain multilayered wall 
systems.  Seven months later, on August 1, 1994, the EPA announced 
 38. See LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 33, § 2711 (2006) (amending 22 La. Reg. 699 
(Aug. 1996) and prohibiting averaging of bulk sample content); 06-096-425 ME. CODE 
R. § 4 (Weil 2003) (mandating 1993 test method for flooring samples); 453 MASS. CODE 
REGS. 6.08 (2006); MINN. R. 4620.3460 (1996) (prohibiting averaging as set forth in the 
EPA’s second clarification); 20 Minn. Reg. 2765, 2770 (June 24, 1996); 38 N.J. Reg. 
2526 (June 5, 2006); 25 TEXAS ADMIN. CODE § 295.32 (2007); 18 VA. ADMIN. CODE § 
15-20-459.3 (2006). 
 39. 27 Tex. Reg. 11,424, 11,426, 11,443 (Dec. 6, 2002). 
 40. See Testing of Bulk Material Samples, 38 N.J. Reg. 2526-29 (June 5, 2006). 
 41. See Letter from Michael E. Beard, EPA Atmospheric Research and Exposure 
Assessment Lab., to all Asbestos Analytical Laboratories (Sept. 7, 1993) (on file with 
authors). 
 42. Id. 
 43. See Asbestos NESHAP Clarification Regarding Analysis of Multi-layered 
Systems, 59 Fed. Reg. 542 (Jan. 5, 1994). 




in the Federal Register the availability of an “improved” scientific 
test method (the 1993 test method) that explicitly rejects averaging.44
3. In 1995, the EPA was forced to respond yet again to ongoing 
public frustration in harmonizing the NESHAP’s 1990 test method 
(averaging) and the nonbinding 1993 test method (no averaging).45  
In the face of the irreconcilable positions of the two test methods, 
the EPA elected to point to its long-standing “unwritten policy” 
against averaging.46  The EPA admonished industry that its regulatory 
objectives are more accurately set forth in the nonpromulgated 1993 
test method, and EPA promised to amend the NESHAP regulation 
to make the 1993 test method binding new law.47  The agency has 
never done so. 
In practical terms, the 1993 test method remains today, at most, a 
nonbinding, regulatory safe harbor to ascertain whether material is potentially 
regulated by the asbestos NESHAP, because the 1993 test method is 
deliberately calculated to encompass a broader range of materials than 
the NESHAP itself mandates.  Stated differently, the nonbinding method 
is deliberately overinclusive.  The SDG&E and Harenda Enterprises cases 
present a different issue, however, and one of first impression under the 
asbestos NESHAP: whether the EPA’s “unwritten policy” about what 
ought to be regulated using nonbinding and discretionary test methods 
can be applied outside a promulgated regulation as an instrument of 
prosecution.  At least two courts have rejected the enforceability of the 
EPA’s “unwritten policy.” 
III.  ASBESTOS MATERIAL TESTING IN UNITED STATES V. SDG&E            
AND STATE V. HARENDA ENTERPRISES 
The material at issue in SDG&E comprised 9.23 miles of coated 
natural gas underground pipelines that were buried at a sixteen acre site 
for five decades.48  The natural gas storage facility was constructed in 
1953 to 1955 and decommissioned in 1999.  The pipes were unearthed 
and removed over the course of several months during 2000 and 2001. 
 44. See Advisory Regarding Availability of an Improved Asbestos Bulk Sample 
Analysis Test Method; Supplementary Information on Bulk Sample Collection and 
Analysis, 59 Fed. Reg. 38,970 (Aug. 1, 1994). 
 45. See Asbestos NESHAP Clarification Regarding Analysis of Multi-Layered 
Systems, 60 Fed. Reg. 65,243 (Dec. 19, 1995). 
 46. Id. at 65,243. 
 47. Id. 
 48. The background facts of the SDG&E case are set forth in SDG&E’s motion to 
declare the case complex.  Defendants’ Memorandum of Points and Authorities in 
Support of Motion to Declare Case Complex at 3–10, United States v. San Diego Gas & 
Elec., No. 06CR0065 DMS (S.D. Cal. Feb. 3, 2006). 
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The pipe coating material was tested with the pipe in situ before and 
more extensively after pipe access became available upon trenching.  The 
pipe coating was removed by licensed asbestos abatement subcontractors 
on-site both manually and mechanically with the oversight of California 
certified asbestos consultants.  The removed anti-corrosive pipe coating 
was sent to a licensed asbestos disposal facility.  Three separate courtesy 
notices of nonfriable operations were provided to the delegated county 
air pollution control district.  County air inspectors visited the site over 
twenty times.  All air and soil testing demonstrated no releases of asbestos 
fibers contemporaneously with removal operations.49
County inspectors became concerned in response to citizen noise and 
odor complaints that mechanical removal would render the coating 
friable and issued notices of violation.  EPA Region 9 was consulted, 
which concluded during a one-hour field inspection in January 2001 
that, although the coating was nonfriable while affixed on the pipe, 
any mechanical removal would render asbestos-containing material 
regulated.  The EPA did not then observe the machine in operation.  
Years after project completion, the County of San Diego sued SDG&E’s 
parent company, Sempra Energy, in August 2005 for over $1.5 million 
in civil penalties but summarily dismissed the civil action seven months 
later in March 2006 during depositions of its inspectors.50
The federal government indicted SDG&E in January 2006 and, for the 
first time, performed material testing on six remaining 2001 coating 
samples at the EPA’s National Enforcement Investigations Center in 
Denver, Colorado. 
All project contractor and government asbestos bulk samples of the 
pipe coating from 1998 to 2006, including all EPA tests following the 
indictment, adhered exclusively to the nonbinding 1993 test method 
NVLAP-certified laboratories are required to perform.  The government 
so admitted.51  No bulk samples were analyzed under the 1990 test method 
 49. Air testing was performed separately by the project contractors, California 
certified asbestos consultants, County of San Diego regulators, and even the California 
EPA.  Over 300 air samples and 180 soil samples were obtained with no detections of 
any asbestos fibers during or after on-site abatement operations.  Id. at 7. 
 50. See Complaint, People v. Sempra Energy, No. GIE028660 (Cal. Super. Ct. 
Aug. 30, 2005); Dismissal, People v. Sempra Energy, No. GIE028660 (Cal. Super. Ct. 
Mar. 28, 2006). 
 51. Government Bill of Particulars, supra note 10, at 9:18–22. 




by any laboratory from 1998 to 2006.52  Nor did sufficient physical 
evidence remain, in the view of the defense, five to six years after 
project completion to faithfully perform the 1990 test method for the 
original 9.23 miles of multilayered pipe coating material. 
The former SDG&E pipe coating material was a multilayered, coal 
tar-based coating comprised of the following: (i) primer coating on the 
bare steel pipe; (ii) one application of hot coal tar enamel (similar in 
texture to coal tar used in roofing operations); (iii) fiberglass felt; (iv) a 
second application of hot coal tar enamel; (v) coal tar saturated “asbestos 
felt”; and (vi) white wash to reduce solar heating.53  The government 
conceded the SDG&E pipe coating material was “made up of multiple 
layers,” which were “distinct and dissimilar.”54
Coal tar pipe wrap specifications in the 1950s were well established 
within the pipe industry and comprised multilayered material affixed 
together by various layers of hot coal tar enamel that bonded all layers 
into a permanently cohesive composite material upon cooling.55  Once 
applied under extremely high-temperature conditions (over 400°F), the 
coal tar coating and its embedded layers were permanently affixed and 
did not delaminate or “peel like an onion” upon removal.  The saturated 
asbestos felt layer (a commercial and patented product from companies 
such as Allied Chemical and Johns-Manville)56 is itself saturated within 
a type of coal tar and formed into long sheets and stored on heavy rolls 
(like pulp paper rolls) for future application at a coating plant or in the 
field.  Saturated asbestos felt is black and described as having the 
consistency of heavy, coal tar roofing paper and is occasionally confused 
with, but is different than, roofing paper.57
Asbestos-containing coal tar pipe wrap has been used by the utility 
industry for many decades on thousands of miles of pipe,58 and such 
 52. In SDG&E, a total of seventy-five bulk samples were analyzed by five 
different laboratories between 1998 and 2006.  Defendants’ Points and Authorities in 
Support of Joint Motion to Dismiss Counts 1, 2, 3 and 5 of the Indictment for Failure to 
State an Offense Involving Jurisdictional Amount of Regulated Asbestos-Containing 
Material at 11–13, United States v. San Diego Gas & Elec., No. 06CR0065 DMS (S.D. 
Cal. Oct. 18, 2006). 
 53. See id. at 12–13 (pipe coating field specifications); accord KOPPERS CO., 
BITUMASTIC PIPE LINE HANDBOOK 9–11 (1953). 
 54. Government Bill of Particulars, supra note 10, at 9:11–19. 
 55. See KOPPERS CO., supra note 53, at 40–46 (providing coal tar coating 
applications at relevant time, including multilayered construction). 
 56. See Asbestos Pipeline Felt, U.S. Patent No. 3,607,515 (filed July 18, 1967); 
NAT’L ASS’N OF PIPE COATING APPLICATORS, INTERIM SPECIFICATIONS FOR SATURATED 
ASBESTOS PIPELINE FELT § 5-69 (1969). 
 57. See KOPPERS CO., supra note 53, at 10, 13, 42–43, 44, 52, 64–66. 
 58. See id. at 11, 44–45, 64; JOHNS-MANVILLE CORP., PRODUCTS HANDBOOK 46 
(1955) (discussing Transhield® asbestos pipe line felt and stating that asbestos felt “now 
protects more than 100,000 miles of oil and gas pipe lines”); JOHNS-MANVILLE CORP., 
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coating has been both removed and applied mechanically in the field.  
Asbestos-containing pipe wrap was banned from commerce with most 
other asbestos products starting on August 27, 1990,59 but applications of 
asbestos-containing coal tar pipe wrap remain on many active pipelines 
around the country. 
In SDG&E, the thickness of the entire pipe coating in its original field 
condition (pre-removal) was described by third party eyewitnesses as 
approximately one-half to one inch in thickness.60  Using the nonbinding 
1993 test method, the government instead purported to test after the 
2006 indictment a one millimeter-thick “piece” of one layer of the 
coating only, after physically isolating any remnants of the embedded 
asbestos felt layer using a microscope and laboratory instruments.61
Between 1998 and 2006, a total of seventy-five pipe coating bulk 
samples were tested by five different laboratories, including tests by 
three nongovernment and two government laboratories (one state and 
one federal).62  There was no dispute regarding the specific test method 
upon which the California and Wisconsin prosecutions were based.  
Preliminarily, in SDG&E, the government conceded in its Bill of 
Particulars that its indictment was based exclusively upon the 1993 test 
method.  Citing to the EPA’s 1994 clarification of multilayered testing, 
the federal government explained the 1993 test method upon which its 
prosecution rested as follows: 
If a material believed to contain asbestos consists of several distinct and 
dissimilar layers, each layer must be separately analyzed for its asbestos 
content.  If any of the layers, standing alone, meets the definition of regulated 
asbestos containing material (i.e., over 1% asbestos and friable), then the entire 
material is deemed to be regulated asbestos containing material, and the 
NESHAP work practice standards are applicable to the project.63
JM PRODUCTS MANUAL 48 (1935) (describing “J-M Asbestos Pipe Line Felt[’s]” strength 
to protect coating and resist soil chemicals, water and bacteria). 
 59. After ten years of work, the EPA promulgated a rule banning most commercial 
asbestos products in three stages.  Asbestos; Manufacture, Importation, Processing and 
Distribution in Commerce Prohibitions, 54 Fed. Reg. 29,460 (July 12, 1989).  Asbestos-
containing pipe wrap was banned in “stage 1,” effective August 27, 1990.  Parts of that 
rule were judicially invalidated in Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201 (5th 
Cir. 1991). 
 60. Defendants’ Points and Authorities, supra note 52, at 14–15. 
 61. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, NAT’L ENFORCEMENT INVESTIGATIONS CENTER, 
NEIC RP1134R01 at 5, tbl. 1 (2006) (all testing limited to “1-mm thick piece”).   
 62. See Defendants’ Points and Authorities, supra note 52. 
 63. Government Bill of Particulars, supra note 10, at 9:18–22 (emphasis added). 




In the Wisconsin case, the licensed abatement contractor, Harenda 
Enterprises, Inc. (HEI), obtained over 325 bulk material samples of the 
walls, stairs, and ceiling tiles prior to removal from the Milwaukee 
Auditorium.64  HEI had the samples tested by two independent laboratories.65  
Although various auditorium materials were determined by the outside 
laboratories to exceed one percent asbestos content, the contractor’s 
outside testing of the multilayered wall systems fell below one percent 
when averaged.66  The multilayered wall system was the central issue in 
the 2003 to 2006 civil action.  The State’s testing revealed one of the 
wall system’s layers contained approximately 1.25 to 2.50% asbestos.67  
The State obtained ten additional multilayered wall samples, four of 
which had at least one layer that was reported by the outside testing 
laboratory to contain more than one percent asbestos.68
The Wisconsin trial court in Harenda Enterprises agreed with the 
State that it is “obvious” that the 1990 test method is “not clear.”69  On 
that basis, the court elected to give deference to subsequent 1994 and 
1995 EPA interpretations of the 1990 test method that effectively 
adopted the 1993 test method as the better choice.  The Wisconsin trial 
court found it noteworthy that both the EPA and NVLAP-certified 
laboratories now rely exclusively on the EPA clarifications and the 1993 
test method.70  The State argued, “Harenda cannot ignore, and this Court 
cannot ignore, the EPA’s plain and simple clarification of its confusing 
rule.”71  Wisconsin believed that the application of the 1990 test method 
would lead to an “absurd result” because a thin layer of material with 
greater than one percent asbestos content would be diluted to less than 
one percent content when mathematically combined in a weighted average 
approach with a thick layer of non-asbestos-containing material.72  
Despite the professed ambiguity of the 1990 test method in the eyes 
of both the State and the Harenda Enterprises trial court, the court 
 64. Brief of Defendant-Appellant at 6, State v. Harenda Enters., Inc., 724 N.W.2d 
434 (Wis. Ct. App. 2006) (No. 2005AP1829). 
 65. Id. at 6. 
 66. Brief of Plaintiff-Respondent at 10–11, State v. Harenda Enters., Inc., 724 
N.W.2d 434 (Wis. Ct. App. 2006) (No. 2005AP1829). 
 67. Id. at 11–12. 
 68. Id. at 12. 
 69. Id. at 4, 14–15.  The state argued to the court of appeals that “[w]ithout doubt, 
the language from the [1990 test method] relied upon by defendant Harenda in making 
his argument has led to considerable confusion in the regulated industry.”  Id. at 21–22. 
 70. Id. at 7. 
 71. Id. at 25. 
 72. Wisconsin used the example of twelve inches on non-asbestos-containing 
styrofoam combined with a quarter inch of plaster containing 5% asbestos.  Id. at 22–23. 
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nonetheless reached the conclusion that the EPA “clarifications are not 
legislative rules” that require rulemaking.73
The SDG&E court concluded just the opposite.  The federal court held 
that the two EPA “clarifications have the effect of fashioning a new test 
method.”74  It ruled that the 1993 test method is a legislative rule requiring 
rulemaking procedures and, in the absence of rulemaking procedures, 
the test method “may not provide the basis for the Government’s 
prosecution.”75  The court concluded that the indictment therefore failed 
to allege all essential elements of the offense and dismissed all NESHAP 
work practice counts.76
IV.  HISTORY OF THE EPA’S ASBESTOS NESHAP REGULATION 
A.  Asbestos Federally Regulated by Patchwork of                               
Statutes and Regulations 
Asbestos is a naturally occurring mineral used for many decades in 
construction materials because of attributes such as heat resistance, 
durability, and tensile strength.77  Asbestos use is regulated by an incongruous 
array of federal statutes and regulations.  The Occupational Safety & 
Health Act of 1970, for example, regulates asbestos worker exposure.78  
The Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977 regulates mine worker 
asbestos exposure.79  TSCA regulates the commercial elimination of 
asbestos products and mandates asbestos warnings and removal actions 
in schools.80  The CAA, in contrast, regulates asbestos emissions during 
manufacturing and the removal of certain asbestos-containing materials 
during “demolitions” or “renovations.”  Under the 1970 CAA amendments, 
the EPA began to regulate asbestos emissions during manufacturing 
operations, product applications, and demolition activities in 1973.81
 73. Id. at 8. 
 74. Order Granting Motion to Dismiss, supra note 9, at 12:7–8. 
 75. Id. at 12:26–13:2. 
 76. Id. at 14–17. 
 77. See Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201, 1207 (5th Cir. 1991). 
 78. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651–678 (2000). 
 79. 30 U.S.C. §§ 801–962 (2000). 
 80. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 2641–2656 (2000). 
 81. National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants; Asbestos, Beryllium, 
and Mercury, 38 Fed. Reg. 8826 (Apr. 6, 1973). 




B.  The Clean Air Act 
The genesis of the modern Clean Air Act dates back to the 1950s.82  
The Act has been amended and expanded more than ten times.83  The 
1970 CAA amendments authorized the EPA to identify and regulate 
“hazardous air pollutants” or HAPs.84  For the next twenty years, until 
the 1990 CAA amendments, the EPA identified only eight hazardous air 
pollutants through rulemaking alone.85  Naturally occurring asbestos was 
the first of three hazardous air pollutants identified by the EPA in 1971, 
along with beryllium and mercury.86  The EPA promulgated its first 
asbestos NESHAP regulation (less than two pages in length) in 1973.87  
The NESHAP has been substantively amended four times.88
 82. Air Pollution Control Act of 1955, Pub. L. No. 84-159, 69 Stat. 322 (providing 
federal research and technical assistance to states to develop their own air quality 
standards). 
 83. The major clean air legislation and amendments thereto include the following:  
Clean Air Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399; Clean Air Act Amendments 
of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685; Clean Air Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 
Stat. 1676; Air Quality Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-148, 81 Stat. 485; Motor Vehicle Air 
Pollution Control Act, Pub. L. No. 89-272, 79 Stat. 992; Clean Air Act of 1963, Pub. L. 
No. 88-206, 77 Stat. 392 (amended for additional funding for state air quality research 
programs in 1965, 1966, 1967, and 1969); Air Pollution Control Act of 1955, Pub. L. 
No. 84-159, 69 Stat. 322. 
 84. Clean Air Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676, § 112. 
 85. EPA listed the following eight hazardous air pollutants through rulemaking 
before the 1990 congressionally mandated list of 189 in the 1990 Clean Air Act:          
(1) asbestos, 36 Fed. Reg. 5931 (Mar. 31, 1971); (2) beryllium, 36 Fed. Reg. 5931 (Mar. 
31, 1971); (3) mercury, 36 Fed. Reg. 5931 (Mar. 31, 1971); (4) vinyl chloride, 40 Fed. 
Reg. 59,532 (Dec. 24, 1975); (5) benzene, 42 Fed. Reg. 29,332 (June 8, 1977);             
(6) radionuclides, 44 Fed. Reg. 76,738 (Dec. 27, 1979); (7) inorganic arsenic, 45 Fed. 
Reg. 37,886 (June 5, 1980); and (8) coke oven emissions, 49 Fed. Reg. 36,560 (Sept. 18, 
1984). 
 86. Air Pollution Prevention and Control; List of Hazardous Air Pollutants,   
36 Fed. Reg. 5931 (Mar. 31, 1971). 
 87. National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants; Asbestos, 
Beryllium, and Mercury, 38 Fed. Reg. 8826, 8829–30 (Apr. 6, 1973).  The asbestos 
NESHAP was repromulgated at 40 C.F.R. subpt. M in 1984 after Adamo Wrecking Co. 
v. United States.  434 U.S. 275 (1978).  In Adamo, the Supreme Court invalidated the 
asbestos NESHAP work practices as being unauthorized by the 1970 CAA and an 
erroneous EPA extrapolation of its own authority under then-existing legislation that had 
been later cured in subsequent amendments to the CAA.  See National Emission 
Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants; Amendments to Asbestos Standard, 49 Fed. 
Reg. 13,658 (Apr. 5, 1984). 
 88. National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants; Amendments to 
Standards for Asbestos and Mercury, 40 Fed. Reg. 48,292 (Oct. 14, 1975); National 
Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants; Amendments to Asbestos Standard, 49 
Fed. Reg. 13,658 (Apr. 5, 1984); National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air 
Pollutants; Asbestos NESHAP Revision, 55 Fed. Reg. 48,406 (Nov. 20, 1990).  The 
1994 amendments added an EPA “Interpretative Rule Governing Roof Removal 
Operations” authorizing, among other things, mechanical removal of roofing materials 
using a “rotating blade (RB) roof cutter,” 40 C.F.R. pt. 61, subpt. M, app. A. 
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Under the 1990 CAA amendments, Congress dramatically expanded 
the list of hazardous air pollutants beyond the eight identified through 
slow EPA rulemaking between 1970 and 1990.  Congress unilaterally 
listed 189 hazardous air pollutants in the CAA itself and delegated to the 
EPA the task of framing emission standards regulations for each.  
Congress directed that the EPA “shall promulgate regulations establishing 
emission standards” to achieve the “maximum degree of reduction in 
emissions of the [listed] hazardous air pollutants” taking into consideration, 
among other things, the “cost of achieving such emission reduction,” 
non-air impacts, and energy requirements.89  The EPA is required to review, 
and revise as necessary, the respective NESHAP emission standards not 
less than every eight years.90  The last major revision to the asbestos 
NESHAP took place seventeen years ago in 1990. 
C.  Evolution of the Asbestos NESHAP Regulation 
The asbestos NESHAP (now set forth at 40 C.F.R. subpart M) is an 
EPA regulation with roots in both the 1970 CAA and the 1976 Toxic 
Substances Control Act.91  The asbestos NESHAP bridges Congress’s 
mandate under the 1970 CAA to develop emission standards for hazardous 
air pollutants and the TSCA’s goal of eliminating asbestos-containing 
products from commerce and schools.92  In fact, the 1990 test method to 
quantify asbestos under the NESHAP was enacted originally into law 
through TSCA rulemaking in 1982, which required school authorities to 
 89. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d)(1), (d)(2) (2000). 
 90. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d)(1) (2000). 
 91. A chronology of the asbestos NESHAP is attached as Appendix A.  In general, 
NESHAP regulations can pertain either to specific HAPs, or manufacturing processes or 
“source categories” that emit HAPs as a by-product.  See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. pts. 61, 63 (2006).  
Part 61 contains twenty-two NESHAP regulations for uranium mining, beryllium, beryllium 
rocket motors, mercury, vinyl chloride, radionuclides, benzene, phosphorous plants, 
asbestos, arsenic emissions from copper smelter and glass manufacturing plants, and 
radon.  40 C.F.R. §§ 61.01–.359 (2006).  Part 63 applies to a wide array of manufacturing 
processes, including, for example, shipbuilding and repair of pleasure craft.  40 C.F.R. 
§§ 63.5680–.5779 (2006).  There are at least ninety-two NESHAP regulations.  See 
Thirteen EPA Rules Limiting Emissions of Toxics from Industrial Sites Announced, BNA 
DAILY ENV’T REP. NO. 167, at A-3 (2003). 
 92. See Toxic Substances Control Act § 6, 15 U.S.C. § 2605 (2000); see also 
Asbestos: Manufacture, Importation, Processing, and Distribution in Commerce Prohibitions; 
Final Rule, 54 Fed. Reg. 29,460, 29,468 (July 12, 1989) (describing three-stage ban of 
approximately 94% of all commercial asbestos products under TSCA; banning asbestos-
containing pipewrap effective August 27, 1990). 




inspect and identify friable asbestos in schools.93  That test method was 
readopted in 1987 under rulemaking to implement the Asbestos Hazard 
Emergency Response Act of 1986 (AHERA), legislation that amended and 
expanded TSCA.  The 1990 test method was later explicitly incorporated 
into the asbestos NESHAP and the definition of asbestos-containing 
material in 1990 as part of the last major revisions to the CAA regulation.94  
The 1990 test method remains today the only test authorized by law to 
quantify asbestos in material for purposes of the asbestos NESHAP. 
The asbestos NESHAP evolved most dramatically during its first seventeen 
years, and has remained fairly static since the 1990 amendments.  The 
original 1973 asbestos NESHAP regulation started very modestly.95  It 
mandated three to four basic “procedures” to remove friable material 
before “demolition” of buildings to limit the extent of “emissions of 
particulate asbestos material to outside air.”96
The concept of friability was left completely undefined until 1975, at 
which time the EPA amended the NESHAP regulation to define “friable 
asbestos material” as “any material that contains more than 1 percent 
asbestos by weight and that can be crumbled, pulverized, or reduced to 
powder, when dry, by hand pressure.”97  In defining friability in 1975, 
the agency reasoned that: 
EPA’s intention was to distinguish between materials that would readily release 
asbestos fibers when damaged or disturbed and those materials that were 
unlikely to result in the release of significant amounts of asbestos fibers.  To 
accomplish this, EPA labeled as “friable” those materials that were likely to 
readily release fibers.98
The EPA stated that the intent of the 1975 NESHAP amendments and its 
definition of friability “is not to control handling of vinyl-asbestos floor 
tile, asbestos felt roofing, or other similar materials, since it is the 
Administrator’s judgment that such activities will not release asbestos in 
 93. See Friable Asbestos-Containing Materials in Schools; Identification and 
Notification, 47 Fed. Reg. 23,360, 23,376 (May 27, 1982). 
 94. Id. (original TSCA 1982 test method); Asbestos-Containing Materials in 
Schools; Final Rule and Notice, 52 Fed. Reg. 41,826, 41,837 (Oct. 30, 1987) (stating in 
1987 that the existing 1982 TSCA test method is “sufficient” for AHERA purposes); 
National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants; Asbestos NESHAP Revision; 
Final Rule, 55 Fed. Reg. 48,406, 48,410 (Nov. 20, 1990) (incorporating 1987 AHERA 
test method into 1990 asbestos NESHAP amendments).  Thus, the test methods under 
TSCA (1982), AHERA (1987) and the asbestos NESHAP (1990) are identical. 
 95. National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants; Asbestos, Beryllium, 
and Mercury, 38 Fed. Reg. 8826, 8829–30 (Apr. 6, 1973). 
 96. Id. at 8829 (no “visible emissions” allowed to outside air). 
 97. National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants; Asbestos and 
Mercury, 40 Fed. Reg. 48,292, 48,299 (Oct. 14, 1975) (emphasis added). 
 98. National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants; Asbestos NESHAP 
Revision; Final Rule, 55 Fed. Reg. 48,406, 48,408 (Nov. 20, 1990). 
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a manner which is dangerous to human health.”99  The EPA also recognized 
for many years that the hand pressure field test for determining friability 
is “somewhat subjective.”100  However, no objective measure for determining 
friability had yet been developed.  The EPA deemed the human hand 
pressure test adequate for “most materials.”101  The NESHAP rule also was 
amended in 1975 to include renovation projects, another perceived 
major source of asbestos fiber emissions.102
The asbestos NESHAP regulation was next amended in 1984.  
Essentially, the work practices were repromulgated in 1984 after the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States,103 
which determined that the work practices were not then explicitly authorized 
by an earlier version of the CAA.104  Major substantive NESHAP 
changes would take place in 1990, certain of which were the genesis of 
the SDG&E criminal and Harenda Enterprises civil cases.  Indeed, most 
criminal asbestos NESHAP prosecutions postdate the 1990 amendments 
to the regulation.105
D.  1990 Asbestos NESHAP Amendments 
In January 1989, the EPA commenced nearly two years of CAA 
rulemaking that led to major revisions in the asbestos NESHAP because 
of the “overwhelming consensus among enforcement officials and 
industry groups that there is a significant level of noncompliance and 
confusion with the NESHAP.”106  For example, in 1990, the EPA first 
 99. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, OFFICE OF AIR & WASTE MGMT., EPA-450/2-74-
009A, BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON NATIONAL EMISSION STANDARDS FOR HAZARDOUS 
AIR POLLUTANTS—PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO STANDARDS FOR ASBESTOS AND 
MERCURY 16 (1974). 
 100. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 18, at 4-11. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Amendments to Standards for Asbestos and Mercury, 40 Fed. Reg. 48,292, 
48,299 (Oct. 14, 1975).  “Demolition” requires the “wrecking or taking out of any load-
supporting structural member.”  40 C.F.R. § 61.141 (2006).   In 1994, the EPA construed 
the removal of underground pipes as “renovation” activity because of the absence of a 
“load-bearing” component for underground pipes.  See EPA-Clean Air Act Applicability 
Determination Index, Control No. A960010, http://cfpub.epa.gov/adi/index.cfm?CFID= 
(click on “Search by Document Control Number” hyperlink, select “A960010” from list, 
select “Display/Submit Query,” select “Submit Query,” and select “A960010” hyperlink). 
 103. 434 U.S. 275 (1978). 
 104. National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants; Amendments to 
Asbestos Standard, 49 Fed. Reg. 13,658, 13,658–65 (Apr. 5, 1984). 
 105. See supra note 21. 
 106. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 18, at 3-1. 




defined the concepts of “Category I” and “Category II” nonfriable, 
asbestos-containing materials (ACM) to help separate lower-risk and 
higher-risk asbestos-containing materials.107  “EPA has been able to compile 
a list of nonfriable ACM that, under normal conditions, do not have to 
be removed prior to demolition operations.  These ACM [Category I 
materials] are not expected to release significant amounts of asbestos 
fibers to the outside air during demolition . . . .”108
Today there are four Category I materials that “under normal 
conditions, do not have to be removed prior to demolition operations” 
because the EPA believes they pose a lower risk of releasing fibers into 
the air during demolition or renovation operations.109  The four materials 
are (i) resilient floor covering; (ii) asphalt roofing products; (iii) gaskets; 
and (iv) packings.  Anything not expressly identified as Category I is, by 
definition, Category II material.110  Multilayered, coal tar pipe wrap like 
that in the SDG&E case is not included in the enumerated list of 
Category I materials, and therefore constitutes Category II material, 
although the EPA equivocated on this basic issue.111
The 1990 NESHAP amendments moved away from the original 1973 
weight-based standard to determine asbestos quantity in materials (1% 
by weight) to more of a two-dimensional area-based standard (1% by 
area) for single-layered material.  The EPA did not specify how to average 
the layer-specific results for multilayered material (for example, average 
by volume or weight of the layers).  The EPA also decided it was “long 
overdue” to adopt a specific test method to determine asbestos content to 
“reduce confusion over what activities are subject to the regulation.”112  
However, the EPA recognized that a promulgated test method would 
carry heavy agency obligations: 
 107. National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants; Asbestos NESHAP 
Revision, 55 Fed. Reg. 48,406, 48,409 (Nov. 20, 1990); accord U.S. ENVTL. PROT. 
AGENCY, supra note 18, at 7-110. 
 108. National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants; Asbestos NESHAP 
Revision, 55 Fed. Reg. at 48,409. 
 109. Id. 
 110. 40 C.F.R. § 61.141 (2006) (definitions). 
 111. The Bill of Particulars in SDG&E devotes four pages to the government’s 
ongoing and profound contradictions on whether coal tar pipe coating is Category I or II 
material.  Government Bill of Particulars, supra note 10, at 2–6.  Various EPA letters 
also take inconsistent positions regarding whether the pipe wrap is Category I or 
Category II.  In 1992, the EPA described pipe wrap coating as “Category II nonfriable 
ACM.”  See Letter from John B. Rasnic, Dir. of EPA Office of Air Quality Planning and 
Standards, to Williams Pipe Line Co. (May 22, 1992) (on file with authors).  The EPA 
Region 9 inspector also took inconsistent positions on whether the coating is Category I 
or II material during the course of the SDG&E matter. 
 112. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 18, at 4-8. 
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One advantage to including the analytical method for the identification and 
quantification of asbestos directly in the NESHAP is that the method is then 
readily available to those who have an interest in the asbestos NESHAP.  A 
disadvantage of this approach is that, when the analytical method is revised as 
a result of improvements in methodology, the analytical method contained in the 
NESHAP cannot be changed without going through lengthy and time-
consuming procedures to amend the regulation. . . .  The EPA believes that, by 
including the analytical method used to determine asbestos content in the 
definition, future misinterpretation of the definition is unlikely.113
The EPA ultimately decided to incorporate the preexisting test method 
from TSCA (1982) and AHERA (1987) into the asbestos NESHAP 
regulation (1990).  The EPA’s decision meant that the asbestos NESHAP 
test method would change automatically with any test method updates 
promulgated under TSCA or AHERA, without mandating separate CAA 
rulemaking to keep the asbestos test method uniform and consistent 
under TSCA, AHERA, and the CAA.  The EPA recognized as early as 1990 
that the enumerated test method adopted into the 1990 NESHAP was 
virtually “locked in place” until such time as either (1) the asbestos 
NESHAP regulation was amended to adopt a new or unique asbestos 
NESHAP test method, or (2) the TSCA/AHERA test method regulation 
(incorporated by reference into the asbestos NESHAP and the definition 
of RACM) was amended.  Notably, this did not occur: RACM’s definition 
and its governing test method have never been changed since 1990.114
The existing NESHAP regulation definition states RACM must 
contain “more than 1 percent asbestos as determined using the method 
specified in [TSCA/AHERA] appendix E, subpart E, 40 CFR part 763, 
section 1, Polarized Light Microscopy.”115  As indicated by this language, 
the NESHAP regulation cross-references to a non-CAA, AHERA regulation.  
Specifically, the 1990 test method incorporated by reference into the 
NESHAP is outlined in fifteen pages of the AHERA regulation for 
schools and public buildings.116
 113. Id. at 4-16 (emphasis added). 
 114. Id.  The EPA notes the downside to adopting a test method in a NESHAP 
regulation is that when test improvements became available, the NESHAP test method 
“cannot be changed without going through lengthy and time-consuming procedures to 
amend the regulation.”  Id. 
 115. 40 C.F.R. § 61.141 (2006) (definitions) (emphasis added). 
 116. 40 C.F.R. pt. 763, subpt. E, app. E (2006). 




E.  1990 Asbestos NESHAP Work Practices 
The asbestos NESHAP does not establish any maximum level of 
asbestos fibers that may be released in the air during removal activities.  
In 1975, the EPA explained that the omission resulted from the fact that 
analytical test methods for airborne asbestos were relatively inaccurate at 
the time, and geographically diffuse, urban demolitions and renovations did 
not easily lend themselves to a precise and workable point to monitor 
total asbestos emissions. 
Congress has specified that EPA should set emission standards for hazardous air 
pollutants.  EPA, charged with implementing this requirement, has determined 
that the term “emission standard” includes work practice requirements designed 
to limit emissions. . . .  These methods of control are required because of the 
impossibility at this time of prescribing and enforcing allowable numerical 
concentrations or mass emissions limitations.  One difficulty in prescribing a 
numerical emission standard is the relative inaccuracy of asbestos analytical 
methods.117
Fifteen years later, in response to public comments supporting 
numerical asbestos emission standards and as part of the 1990 NESHAP 
amendments, the EPA balked again because it was still “not aware that 
methods of measuring asbestos concentrations in ambient air [were] 
available at an acceptable cost for routine monitoring purposes.”118
As a concession to practicality and cost, the EPA decided to control 
emissions of specific forms of asbestos fibers119 indirectly through 
“work practices” rather than numerical emission standards.  The number 
of applicable NESHAP work practices can vary depending on the 
project, but generally comprise less than one dozen possible low-tech 
field measures that have the practical effect in the EPA’s eyes of limiting 
or minimizing asbestos fiber releases into the ambient air.  The EPA is 
the first to acknowledge that these work practices are not designed to 
guarantee or achieve zero asbestos fiber emissions; rather, the EPA 
 117. National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants; Amendments to 
Standards for Asbestos and Mercury, 40 Fed. Reg. 48,292, 48,296 (Oct. 14, 1975) 
(emphasis added). 
 118. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 18, at 7-110 (emphasis added). 
 119. Asbestos means “asbestiform varieties of serpentine (chrysotile), riebeckite 
(crocidolite), cummingtonite-grunerite, anthrophyllite, and actinolite-tremolite.”  40 
C.F.R. § 61.141 (2006).  In the high profile criminal case of United States v. W.R. Grace, 
the court excluded all Libby, Montana asbestos data that pertained to species of asbestos 
that fell outside the enumerated NESHAP definition.  455 F. Supp. 2d 1122 (D. Mont. 
2006) (No. CR 05-07-M-DWM), appeal docketed, No. 06-30472 (9th Cir. Sept. 5, 
2006).  See Order, supra note 24.  That exclusionary order is now on appeal to the Ninth 
Circuit. 
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envisions that the work practices simply limit asbestos emissions to an 
acceptable level.120
Following the 1990 NESHAP amendments, and depending on the 
specific project, the generally applicable work practices for RACM are 
set forth below: 
 
No. ASBESTOS NESHAP WORK PRACTICES 
1. Written Notification to Agency of Intention to 
Demolish/Renovate Covered Facility Ten Working Days 
Prior to Commencement of Activities 
40 C.F.R. § 61.145(a)(2), 61.145(a)(4), 61.145(b) (2006) 
2. Remove “Regulated” ACM Before Material is Disturbed 
40 C.F.R. § 61.145(c)(1) (2006) 
3. Competent Person Trained in Asbestos NESHAP 
Regulation On-Site to Supervise “Regulated” ACM 
Removal (40-hour course) 
40 C.F.R. § 61.145(c)(8) (2006) 
4. “Regulated” ACM “Adequately Wet” Until Collected 
During Removal or Demolition, or Negative Pressure 
Enclosure if Wetting Unavailable 
40 C.F.R. § 61.145(c)(3), (c)(6), (c)(9) (2006) 
5. Seal “Regulated” ACM While Wet in Leak-Tight 
Containers with OSHA Labels 
40 C.F.R. § 61.150(a)(1)(iii) (2006) 
6. Leak-Tight Wrapping for Removed “Regulated” ACM 
40 C.F.R. § 61.145(c)(3), (c)(4) (2006) 
 
 120. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, OFFICE OF AIR & WATER PROGRAMS, APTD-1503, 
BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL EMISSION STANDARDS 
FOR HAZARDOUS AIR POLLUTANTS: ASBESTOS, BERYLLIUM, AND MERCURY 26 (1973). 
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No. ASBESTOS NESHAP WORK PRACTICES 
7. Deposit “Regulated” ACM at Licensed Disposal Site 
40 C.F.R. § 61.150(b) (2006) 
 
As explained by the Supreme Court in Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United 
States,121 the EPA chose to regulate asbestos fibers released into the air 
indirectly through work practices where the agency felt it could not 
feasibly regulate actual emissions.  In response to the Supreme Court’s 
1978 ruling vacating a criminal NESHAP asbestos work practices case 
in Adamo Wrecking Co., the CAA now explicitly authorizes the EPA to 
adopt work practices “if it is not feasible in the judgment of the 
Administrator to prescribe or enforce an emission standard for control of 
a hazardous air pollutant.”122  In the EPA’s view, the policy goal of 
“vindicating the work practices” is more important than demonstrating 
conclusively through actual air monitoring that no releases of asbestos 
fibers occurred in real time.  The futility of wetting a water-repellant 
coal tar or the real possibility that wetting might be less effective than 
eliminating actual emissions are equally beside the point and irrelevant 
to the EPA under the existing regulation. 
F.  Three Jurisdictional Elements for Asbestos-Containing                
Material to be “Regulated” and Subject to Work                                 
Practices under the 1990 NESHAP Amendments 
Not all materials containing asbestos, and not all demolition and 
renovation projects, are regulated.  The material and project must, among 
other things, exceed certain thresholds regarding project size and asbestos 
content.  “Regulated” material is broader by definition than friable material 
alone.  In addition to friable material, RACM may include presently nonfriable 
material that will be subject to certain future acts of disturbance.  Under 
all circumstances, however, to be regulated, the government must 
demonstrate three elements.123  An analytical roadmap of the asbestos 
NESHAP is attached as Appendix B. 
a. PROJECT QUANTITY THRESHOLD: The amount of asbestos-
containing material to be removed during the project must exceed 
a minimum threshold: (i) 260 linear feet on pipes; (ii) 160 square 
 
 121. 434 U.S. 275, 286–87 (1978). 
 122. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(h)(1) (2000). 
 123. See Order Granting Motion to Dismiss, supra note 9, at 6:11–21. 
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feet on other facility components; or (iii) 35 cubic feet where length 
or area cannot be measured.124  The size of the project is thus a 
jurisdictional predicate for the NESHAP regulation. 
b. PERCENT THRESHOLD OF ASBESTOS IN MATERIAL: The 
quantity of asbestos fibers in the material must exceed 1% as 
determined by the 1990 test method (or the identical 1982 TSCA or 
1987 AHERA test method) only.125  The quantity of asbestos in the 
material is thus a jurisdictional predicate for the NESHAP 
regulation. 
c. REMOVAL PROCESS INVOLVES FRIABLE MATERIAL OR 
PROCESS RENDERS, OR IS LIKELY TO RENDER, CATEGORY I OR 
CATEGORY II, NONFRIABLE, ASBESTOS-CONTAINING MATERIAL 
FRIABLE: Since 1990, the asbestos NESHAP now divides the universe 
of nonfriable asbestos-containing materials into the mutually 
exclusive groups of Category I or Category II material.  Asbestos-
containing material becomes “regulated” (assuming it exceeds the 
project size and percentage jurisdictional thresholds noted above) 
under four possible circumstances: 
(1) The material already is in friable126 condition, pre-disturbance; 
(2) The four enumerated Category I nonfriable, asbestos-containing 
materials become friable during removal or disturbance; 
(3) The four enumerated Category I nonfriable, asbestos-containing 
materials will be, or have been, subject to the following acts 
of disturbance: “sanding,” “grinding,” “cutting,” or “abrading”; or 
(4) The remaining universe of Category II nonfriable, asbestos-
containing materials have a “high probability” of becoming 
“crumbled, pulverized or reduced to powder” (that is, friable) 
by the “forces expected to act on the material in the course of 
demolition or renovation operations.”127
 124. See 40 C.F.R. § 61.145(a) (2006). 
 125. See 40 C.F.R. § 61.141 (2006) (defining “friable” and “nonfriable” asbestos-
containing materials) (emphasis added); 40 C.F.R. pt. 763, subpt. E, app. E, § 1 (2006). 
 126. “Friable asbestos material means any material containing more than 1 percent 
asbestos as determined using [the 1990 test method/1987 AHERA test method] specified 
in appendix E, subpart E, 40 CFR part 763, section 1 . . . that, when dry, can be 
crumbled, pulverized, or reduced to powder by hand pressure.”  40 C.F.R. § 61.141 
(2006) (emphasis added). 
 127. Id. (defining “regulated asbestos-containing material”). 




The SDG&E court held that it was not enough for the government to 
allege project size only in an indictment and disregard other elements, 
such as percentage content and the Category I or II nature of the 
material.128
G.  Major Substantive Distinctions Exist Between the NESHAP 1990 
Test Method and the EPA 1993 Test Method 
There are at least five substantive differences between the 1990 and 
1993 test methods.  Of paramount importance, the 1990 test method, 
which mandates the analysis and averaging of all layers of multilayered 
material, has been through federal rulemaking three times.  In contrast, 
the 1993 test method rejects basic tenets of the 1990 test method (averaging) 
and has never been through federal rulemaking.129  In addition to the 
obvious disparity in legal standing and rules of quantification, the differences 
extend to the size of reliable samples and laboratory determinations of 
friability, a unique feature of the 1993 test method.  These incompatible 
approaches and definitions profoundly affect what is considered 
“regulated,” and therefore what actions are subject to prosecution. 
Whereas the 1990 test method mandates “representative,” multilayered 
samples to quantify asbestos content layer-by-layer, the 1993 test 
method deems material to be “regulated” if any single layer (or portion 
thereof) contains over 1% asbestos.  As applied by the EPA laboratory in 
the SDG&E case, for example, the 1993 test method purports to 
characterize the asbestos content of 9.23 miles of pipe coating on the 
weight of a “1 millimeter piece” of any single layer of the coating.  In 
fact, the government represented in SDG&E that, for purposes of 
demonstrating a crime, a “one gram [0.035 ounce] sample of material is 
more than sufficient to perform the necessary testing to determine a [sic] 
whether a violation of the Clean Air Act has occurred.”130  Even the 
EPA has flatly disagreed with this position outside the 2006 SDG&E 
prosecution.  The 1993 test method starts from the premise that a 
“sample should be of sufficient size to provide for an adequate 
examination.”131  “Generally, samples of insufficient volume should be 
 128. See Order Granting Motion to Dismiss, supra note 9, at 14–17. 
 129. Various states have adopted the EPA’s recommended 1993 test method 
following proper rulemaking procedures.  New Jersey even issued emergency rules in 
June 2006 adopting the 1993 test method for purposes of its own state asbestos laws.  38 
N.J. Reg. 2526–29 (June 5, 2006). 
 130. Letter from Melanie K. Pierson, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
to Gregory A. Vega et al. (July 18, 2006) (on file with authors). 
 131.  U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 17, at 3. 
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rejected and further analysis curtailed . . .” because it adversely affects 
reliability.132
For pipe wrap, the 1993 test method recommends a minimum of three 
to four square inches of all layered material.133  The EPA’s 1993 test 
method considers anything less than fifteen grams for a single sample to 
be a “small quantity” bulk sample requiring special precautions to avert 
rejection for unreliability.134
The 1990 test method also stands in stark contrast to the EPA’s 
nonpromulgated 1993 test method because the binding method makes no 
laboratory determination of friability, as a predictor of the material’s 
actual condition in the field.  Under the asbestos NESHAP, friability 
determinations are reserved to accredited or certified experts inspecting 
the original material in the field.  A material’s condition in the field is 
not necessarily representative of the condition of a sample in the 
laboratory one day or, as in the SDG&E case, five to six years later.135  
Laboratories analyze bulk samples under the 1990 test method for two 
limited purposes: (1) to determine asbestos content, and (2) to identify 
the type of any asbestos fiber that is present.  The fact that various 
laboratories now go much further and purport to report on the friable or 
nonfriable condition of the bulk samples underscores that the 1993 test 
method is now routinely applied. 
Unlike the 1990 test method, the newer 1993 test method requires 
laboratories to report on friability, as that term is separately defined in 
the nonbinding 1993 test method itself.  According to the 1993 test 
method, and in stark contrast to the NESHAP’s 1990 test method, 
laboratories examine “bulk building material” samples for the following: 
 132. Id. at 4 (emphasis added). 
 133. Id. at 3. 
 134. Id. at app. C, C-3. 
 135. In the SDG&E case, the EPA first tested coating material removed in 2001 in 
2006, after that material was used as “training aids” by an EPA inspector.  The material 
was tested again in 2007 in an effort to comply with the 1990 test method after dismissal 
of the original indictment.  See Order Granting Motion to Dismiss, supra note 9. 




[H]omogeneity, texture, friability, color, and the extent of fibrous components 
of the sample. . . .  Friability may be indicated by the ease with which the 
sample is disaggregated (see definitions in Appendix A) as received by the 
analyst.  This does not necessarily represent the friability of the material as 
determined by the assessor at the collection site.136
The 1993 test method’s definition of friability differs substantively 
from the asbestos NESHAP’s definition, thereby exacerbating the 
constitutional dilemma of prosecutions based on the nonbinding test.137  
Thus, when a laboratory reports a bulk sample as “friable” under the 
nonbinding 1993 test method, that description is not necessarily the 
same thing as “friable” under the NESHAP regulation.  According to 
Appendix A of the 1993 test method, friability “[r]efers to the cohesiveness 
of a bulk material, indicating that it may be crumbled or disaggregated 
by hand pressure,”138 which is nothing more than a subjective and 
predictive assessment by a laboratory analyst with the aid of instruments 
of what might actually happen in the field with hand forces and sufficient 
material, but without actually being in the field.  Laboratory technicians 
are called upon by the nonbinding method to predict vicariously from a 
small, one-millimeter piece of material, using laboratory instruments and 
a microscope, whether the original intact material (assuming sufficient 
quantity) may be capable of being crumbled by humans in the field 
with hand pressure while the material is dry.  It is indisputable that the 
nonbinding 1993 test method definition differs from the NESHAP’s 
field-test definition of friability. 
One of the nongovernmental laboratories in the SDG&E case explained 
in the parallel state civil case, People v. Sempra Energy, that the laboratory 
reported on friability in all of its reports to maintain its NVLAP 
accreditation.139  The laboratory also explained that the definition of 
friability for purposes of the 1993 test method is broader and not congruent 
with the competing definition set forth in the asbestos NESHAP 
 136. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 17, at 6 (emphasis added). 
 137. 40 C.F.R. § 61.141 defines “friable asbestos material” as any material           
(1) containing more than 1 percent asbestos, (2) as determined by the 1990 test method, 
that (3) “when dry, can be crumbled, pulverized, or reduced to powder by hand 
pressure.”  For purposes of the 1993 test method, friable refers to the “cohesiveness of a 
bulk material, indicating that it may be crumbled or disaggregated by hand pressure.”  
U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 17, at app. A (Glossary of Terms), A-3 
(emphasis added). 
 138. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 17, at A-3 (emphasis added). 
 139. See Deposition of Virginia Shefa at 117:1–12, People v. Sempra Energy, No. 
GIE028660 (Cal. Super. Ct. Dec. 7, 2005). 
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regulation.140  In the laboratory, an analyst uses a pick to break apart a 
piece of material under a microscope to evaluate friability.141
Taken to its logical extreme, friability under the 1993 test method 
encompasses the universe of material that can be “crumbled” by a lab 
instrument (for example, paper) or “disaggregated” (for example, charcoal 
or dirt).  It does not even necessarily relate to asbestos-containing 
material or, more specifically, asbestos-containing material containing 
more than 1% asbestos, as set forth explicitly in the asbestos NESHAP 
definition.  Accordingly, under the looser definition of the 1993 test 
method, it is conceivable for a laboratory to report material as friable 
that contains trace or no asbestos fibers whatsoever.  The broader and 
purely subjective definition of friability under the 1993 test method 
further operates to expand without rulemaking the regulatory definitions 
for both “friable” and “regulated asbestos-containing material.”  Even if 
the government was free to substitute the nonbinding 1993 test method 
(or any other jurisdictional test method of choice) into the NESHAP 
regulation and RACM’s definition outside rulemaking, which it cannot, 
the inconsistent test methods and definitions of key NESHAP concepts 
in the 1993 test method operate to blur the jurisdictional dividing line 
between regulated and nonregulated material and, in so doing, entirely 
lawful conduct. 
1.  Post-1993 EPA Clarifications to the 1990 NESHAP Test Method 
After circulating its nonbinding test method to the nation’s laboratories in 
September 1993, the EPA twice purported to “clarify” (in 1994 and 1995) 
that the NESHAP’s 1990 test method did not mean what it literally said.  
On August 1, 1994, the EPA issued an advisory in the Federal Register of 
the “availability of an improved” 1993 test method that would avoid 
underreporting for asbestos content in multilayered material.142  Notably, 
the agency took no steps necessary to make the 1993 test method binding 
law.  The EPA reported that its first clarification in 1994 was necessary 
to answer “many questions” regarding the 1990 test method.143  While 
disclaiming that the 1994 clarification in any way replaced the existing 
 140. Id. at 220:3–14. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Advisory Regarding Availability of an Improved Asbestos Bulk Sample 
Analysis Test Method, 59 Fed. Reg. 38,970 (Aug. 1, 1994). 
 143. Asbestos NESHAP Clarifications Regarding Analysis of Multi-Layered Systems, 
59 Fed. Reg. 542 (Jan. 5, 1994). 




asbestos NESHAP 1990 test method, the EPA advised that “when a 
sample consists of two or more distinct layers or materials, each layer 
should be treated separately and the results reported by layer (discrete 
stratum).”144  The “results of the analysis of those individual layers of 
‘add-on’ material may not be averaged . . . .”145  If any add-on 
material exceeds 1%, the entire “project would be subject to the asbestos 
NESHAP.”146
One month following its first clarification, the EPA published an 
Asbestos Sampling Bulletin to educate the public on its new policy 
direction.147  The EPA claimed that its public outreach bulletin did not 
change the law, but it was merely designed to “clarify” multilayered 
material testing and “build[] on” the 1990 test method.  Such an outreach 
was required, according to the EPA, because of ongoing “misidentification” 
of multilayered materials as nonregulated under the literal language of 
the 1990 test method as a result of averaging.148
Two years after the first agency clarification of the 1990 test method 
for multilayered materials, the EPA felt compelled to publish a second 
clarification in 1995 to address “further questions.”149  The EPA explained 
more empathetically on the second occasion that, notwithstanding the 
literal language of the NESHAP regulation, the agency’s “unwritten 
policy” has long been to disregard multilayered “averaging or dilution.”150  
The EPA acknowledged that the literal language of the 1990 test method 
has “led to considerable confusion as to how to analyze multi-layered 
samples for NESHAP purposes.”151  The EPA was forced to concede in 
its December 1995 second clarification that the 1990 test method 
required averaging of multilayered materials, which it viewed as 
decreasing the asbestos content significantly.  But in lieu of subjecting 
its new test method to the rigors of rulemaking and judicial review, the 
EPA simply reinterpreted the literal language of the 1990 test method in 
its second clarification as follows: “If any layer contains greater than one 
percent asbestos, that layer must be treated as asbestos-containing.  This 
will have the effect of requiring all layers in a multi-layered system to be 
treated as asbestos-containing.”152  Both the federal government and the 
 144. Id. (emphasis added). 
 145. Id. (emphasis added). 
 146. Id. 
 147. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, ASBESTOS SAMPLING BULLETIN, OPPT/CMD 7404 
(1994). 
 148. Id. at 1, 2–3. 
 149. Asbestos NESHAP Clarification Regarding Analysis of Multi-Layered Systems, 
60 Fed. Reg. 65,243 (Dec. 19, 1995). 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. (emphasis added). 
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State of Wisconsin adopted the EPA’s “unwritten policy” against 
averaging for purposes of their respective asbestos enforcement programs. 
Taking the EPA’s words in its first and second clarifications at face 
value, either the 1990 test method as written is vague in the agency’s and 
the State of Wisconsin’s eyes, and in need of multiple clarifications, or 
the 1990 test method plainly directs an outcome that the EPA and delegated 
states strongly dislike as a matter of policy.  Either way, erasing elements of 
RACM’s definition and the NESHAP test method from the books as 
“words of no consequence”153 and resorting to a new test method outside 
rulemaking is not a permissible response to bridge the divide between 
law and evolving agency policy.  On the contrary, it is constitutionally 
prohibited and utterly defeats the jurisdictional predicate for enforcement 
under the asbestos NESHAP regulation. 
True to the EPA’s prediction upon the adoption of the first NESHAP 
test method in 1990, the agency acknowledged in 1995 that the NESHAP 
regulation would need to be changed through rulemaking to make the 
1993 test method legally enforceable.  In its 1995 second clarification 
about multilayered averaging, the EPA announced that it “intends to 
amend the asbestos NESHAP in the near future to refer specifically to 
these [1993 test method] procedures.”154  But while the EPA has amended 
the rule to correct typographical errors in the 1990 NESHAP amendments155 
and has passively witnessed seven states undergo rule changes to the 
NESHAP test method, the EPA has taken no CAA rulemaking action 
whatsoever to make the 1993 test method new law. 
The EPA’s failure to perform the rulemaking required to enforce the 
1993 test method contrasts with actions taken by some states, such as 
New Jersey.  On June 5, 2006, the State of New Jersey enacted “emergency 
rules” for the sole purpose of adopting into state law provisions of the 
1993 test method.156  Under pre-2006 New Jersey law, no explicit 
analytical method had been adopted at the state level to test asbestos-
containing material, and according to the State of New Jersey, its various 
 153. Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 140, 149 (1994) (reversing conviction 
where element of crime treated as surplusage).
 154. Id. 
 155. See National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants for Asbestos, 
68 Fed. Reg. 54,790 (Sept. 18, 2003) (providing final rule amending cross-reference 
citations to OSHA citations); National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants 
for Asbestos, 69 Fed. Reg. 43,322 (July 20, 2004) (correcting additional typographical 
errors). 
 156. See Testing of Bulk Material Samples, 38 N.J. Reg. 2526(a) (June 5, 2006). 




departments have typically been “utilizing the analytical method which 
is recommended, but not required, by the Federal Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) for use in testing bulk materials, namely, the 
1993 [test] Method.”157
New Jersey explained that the 1993 test method is preferable to the 
1990 test method because the enumerated NESHAP 1990 test method 
underreports asbestos content: “[M]ulti-layered samples which may 
contain asbestos in a single layer may have been reported by laboratories 
as nonasbestos-containing.”158  New Jersey became alarmed that various 
private contractors had been removing floor tiles in New Jersey schools 
that apparently did not exceed the 1% jurisdictional threshold under the 
1990 test method.  In response, the state initiated emergency rulemaking 
to address the situation where New Jersey contractors could rely lawfully 
upon the 1990 test method and its “false-negative results for the presence of 
asbestos.”159  New Jersey harshly admonished followers of the 1990 test 
method: 
These contractors have chosen to adhere to the strict letter of the Federal 
regulations, utilizing the less precise 1982 Method [referring to 1982 TSCA or 
1990 NESHAP test method] which appears in the Code of Federal Regulations 
at 40 CFR Part 763, Appendix E to Subpart E, rather than adopting the state-of-
the-art 1993 [test] Method which is not an official EPA standard, but rather, has 
been “recommended” by both EPA’s AHERA program for schools and the EPA 
asbestos NESHAP program.160
According to New Jersey, emergency rulemaking was warranted to “establish 
unequivocally” that the 1993 test method applies in that state.161  As 
New Jersey concluded in 2006, the EPA’s 1993 test method has become 
increasingly separated from the NESHAP law.  The SDG&E court ruled 
that the EPA “clarifications have the effect of fashioning a new test method” 
and constitute a nonpromulgated legislative rule.162  The Wisconsin 
court of appeals held that the EPA’s clarifications are “at odds with the 
clear command” of the 1990 test method and declined to give any 
deference to the EPA’s interpretations.163
 157. Id. (emphasis added). 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Order Granting Motion to Dismiss, supra note 9, at 12. 
 163. State v. Harenda Enters., Inc., 724 N.W.2d 434, 438–39 (Wis. Ct. App. 2006), 
rev. granted, 732 N.W.2d 857 (Wis. 2007). 
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2.  1994 Government Accreditation Program Endorsement of the 1993 
Test Method for All Laboratories 
Deepening the divide between what the NESHAP directs and the EPA 
now prefers, the nation’s laboratories promptly heeded the EPA’s two 
back-to-back clarifications in 1994 and 1995.  Government and private 
laboratories are accredited by the U.S. Department of Commerce’s 
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) through its 
National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP).164  At 
the direction of NVLAP in 1994, the 1993 test method has incrementally 
become today’s de facto test method for national laboratory certification.  
The change in standard testing has been well camouflaged. 
NVLAP first promulgated standards for asbestos testing in the same 
month (August 1994) that the EPA first announced the availability of its 
1993 test method in the Federal Register.165  On the one hand, NVLAP 
embraced either the 1990 test method or the 1993 test method.  On the 
other hand, the NVLAP proceeded to direct the nation’s laboratories to 
adhere to the newer method.  The 1994 NVLAP Handbook states, “The 
laboratory shall use the test method contained in the U.S. EPA ‘Interim 
Method for the Determination of Asbestos in Bulk Insulation Samples’ 
[1990 test method] or the current U.S. EPA method for the analysis of 
asbestos in building material [1993 test method]. . . .  The laboratory is 
responsible for ensuring that it implements the latest revision of the 
method.”166  To remain certified under government-approved standards, 
asbestos testing laboratories nationally have been directed since August 
1994 to implement the EPA’s “latest revision of the method,”167 or the 
1993 test method. 
 164. Since 1976, NVLAP has provided third party accreditation services to 
government and private laboratories to promote national uniformity and competence.  
See C.D. FAISON, NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., WHAT IS THE NATIONAL 
VOLUNTARY LABORATORY ACCREDITATION PROGRAM (NVLAP)? 1 (2006), available at 
http://ts.nist.gov/Standards/upload/What-is-the-NVLAP.pdf.  There are 252 national 
laboratories accredited under NVLAP for bulk asbestos testing.  Id. at Attachment II, 1. 
 165. See ERIC B. STEEL ET AL., NAT’L INST. OF TECH. HANDBOOK 150-3, NAT’L 
VOLUNTARY LAB. ACCREDITATION PROGRAM: BULK ASBESTOS ANALYSIS (1994). 
 166. Id. at 11 (emphasis added). 
 167. The 1994 NVLAP Asbestos Handbook expressly and repeatedly cites the 1993 
test method as authority for its accreditation program.  See id. at 1.  The NVLAP 
Asbestos Handbook also adopts the 1993 test method’s definition of friable verbatim, not 
NESHAP’s definition of friable.  Compare id. at 2 (providing that friable “refers to the 
cohesiveness of a bulk material, indicating that it may be crumbled or disaggregated by 
hand pressure”), with 40 CFR § 61.141 (2006) (defining “friable asbestos material” as 




The EPA and NVLAP jointly have promoted the application of the 
1993 test method for over ten years, effectively rewriting the definition 
of RACM and expanding the EPA’s jurisdiction outside rulemaking.  In 
contrast, NVLAP’s own scope of accreditation states that laboratories 
are accredited for asbestos bulk sample analysis under the “Interim 
Method for the Determination of Asbestos in Bulk Insulation Samples” 
as published by the EPA’s Environmental Monitoring Systems Laboratory 
in December 1982 (EPA-600/M4-82-020).  NVLAP erroneously believes 
that EPA-600/M4-82-020 is identical in all respects to the promulgated 
test method.168  It is not.  In 2007, there are up to three different test methods 
all being marketed by either NVLAP or the EPA as the appropriate 
asbestos test method for any and all purposes, including criminal prosecution. 
Despite the EPA’s promise in 1995 of forthcoming rulemaking to 
subject its 1993 test method to public comment and judicial review, and 
the frustration of multiple states concerning the literal language of the 
NESHAP standard, the EPA has never amended the regulation to 
modify or supersede the 1990 test method that it twice felt compelled to 
clarify as either vague, or clear but undesirable.  In its petition for review 
to the Wisconsin Supreme Court, the State took the position that the 
1990 test method is “confusing” and “unclearly written,” and the EPA’s 
1994 and 1995 clarifications legally fill that void.169  In SDG&E, the 
EPA took the opposite position, namely that the 1990 and 1993 tests are 
legally and substantively one and the same.170  The EPA also argued that 
the particular test method is not a jurisdictional predicate to state an 
offense.171  Nonetheless, the EPA has taken no steps to even propose a 
NESHAP rule change. 
The combination of the government’s post-1994 laboratory accreditation 
program promoting the 1993 test method and the EPA’s “unwritten 
“any material containing more than 1 percent asbestos . . . that, when dry, can be crumbled, 
pulverized, or reduced to powder by hand pressure”). 
 168. See Nat’l Inst. of Standards & Tech., U.S. EPA–National Enforcement Investigations 
Center, http://ts.nist.gov/Standards/scopes/1017030.htm (last visited June 4, 2007).  An 
added dimension to this conundrum is that the EPA and NVLAP have apparently yet to 
discover the discrepancies that exist between the 1990 test method set forth in the 
regulation and the EPA-600/M4-82-020 test method.  There is a notable difference 
between the language set forth in the regulation itself and the EPA 1982 laboratory test 
manual upon which NVLAP relies.  Specifically, the EPA-600/M4-82-020 test method 
that is, on its face, the NVLAP standard of accreditation does not include language 
allowing an optional “equivalent estimation method” (as the 1990 test method allows) 
and thus requires 400-point counting only. 
 169. See Petition for Review of a Decision of the Court of Appeals, State v. 
Harenda Enters., Inc., 724 N.W.2d 434 (Wis. Nov. 30, 2006), rev. granted, 732 N.W.2d 
857 (Wis. 2007). 
 170. Government’s Response and Opposition to Defendant’s Motions at 48–49, 
United States v. San Diego Gas & Elec., No. 06CR0065 DMS (S.D. Cal. Oct. 17, 2006). 
 171. Id. at 45. 
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policy”172 to disregard the 1990 test method has created a due process 
conundrum.  SDG&E and Harenda Enterprises are the first cases since 
the 1990 NESHAP amendments to address the implications of basing 
criminal and civil prosecutions upon policy rather than enumerated law. 
H.  Constitutional and Case Law Analysis 
1.  Well-Settled Due Process Principles and Interpretative Canons of 
Strict Construction of Regulations in Criminal Cases Render             
Criminal Prosecutions (and Some Civil Cases) Under the                             
1993 Test Method Defective 
It is well settled that the construction of the asbestos NESHAP 
regulation is a question of law.173  The specific test method to quantify 
asbestos provides a jurisdictional dividing line between what activity is 
lawful and unlawful.  The criminal application of a purely discretionary 
and nonbinding test method developed after, and outside of, rulemaking 
for the asbestos NESHAP violates fundamental principles of due 
process, including the doctrine of “fair warning” and the “rule of lenity.” 
In 1997, a unanimous Supreme Court instructed that the due process 
doctrine of fair warning in criminal cases applies in three contexts: 
 172. Asbestos NESHAP Clarification Regarding Analysis of Multi-Layered Systems, 
60 Fed. Reg. 65,243 (Dec. 19, 1995). 
 173. In United States v. Trident Seafoods Corp., the Ninth Circuit vacated a forty-
four day civil asbestos NESHAP penalty of up to $1.1 million based on the Ninth 
Circuit’s interpretation that the regulation allows only a one-day, noncontinuing “notice 
violation” of not more than $25,000.  60 F.3d 556 (9th Cir. 1995).  Construing the 
NESHAP regulation, the Ninth Circuit concluded that, when the “violation of a 
regulation subjects private parties to criminal or civil sanctions, a regulation cannot be 
construed to mean what an agency intended but did not adequately express.”  Id. at 559 
(citation omitted).  Thus, courts are directed not only to evaluate the jurisdictional 
application of the asbestos NESHAP as a question of law, but they must apply ordinary 
canons of judicial statutory construction, where the “test is not what [the agency] might 
possibly have intended, but what [was] said.”  Id. at 559; Order, supra note 24, at 7 
(stating that defining asbestos under NESHAP presents a legal question).  The Ninth 
Circuit has held that the construction of even environmental “permits” issued pursuant to 
an environmental regulation presents a question of law.  See United States v. 
Weitzenhoff, 35 F.3d 1275, 1288 (9th Cir. 1993) (sewage treatment plant operating 
permit). 




There are three related manifestations of the fair warning requirement.  First, the 
vagueness doctrine bars enforcement of a “statute which either forbids or 
requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence 
must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.” . . .  
Second, as a sort of “junior version of the vagueness doctrine,” . . . the canon of 
strict construction of criminal statutes, or rule of lenity, ensures fair warning by 
so resolving ambiguity in a criminal statute as to apply it only to conduct clearly 
covered. . . .  Third, although clarity at the requisite level may be supplied by 
judicial gloss on an otherwise uncertain statute, . . . due process bars courts from 
applying a novel construction of a criminal statute to conduct that neither the 
statute nor any prior judicial decision has fairly disclosed to be within its 
scope.174
Under the rule of lenity, doubts concerning the scope or application of 
a criminal statute or regulation are resolved in favor of defendants.175  
“The rule of lenity provides that if a court must choose between two 
readings of a criminal statute, the court should apply the more lenient 
one, leaving it to the legislature to speak in clearer terms if the harsher 
alternative is intended.”176  “[B]ecause of the seriousness of criminal 
penalties, and because criminal punishment usually represents the moral 
condemnation of the community, legislatures and not courts should define 
criminal activity.”177  The reason for lenity lies in the constitutionally 
based need for “fair warning.”178  “Because construction of a criminal statute 
must be guided by the need for fair warning, it is rare that legislative 
history or statutory policies will support a construction of a statute broader 
than that clearly warranted by the text.”179
The rule of lenity is particularly appropriate where, as here, the same 
conduct is entirely legal in certain circumstances.180  The rule of lenity 
and the fair notice doctrine apply equally to statutes and regulations.  “If 
a violation of a regulation subjects private parties to criminal or civil 
 174. United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 266 (1997) (citations omitted). 
 175. Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 147–48 (1994) (applying rule to reverse 
criminal tax conviction); United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 348 (1971) (reversing 
firearm conviction because criminal statute vague on jurisdictional “interstate commerce” 
predicate for offense); People v. Materne, 72 F.3d 103, 106 (9th Cir. 1995) (“[R]ule of 
lenity applies where a criminal statute is vague enough to deem both the defendant’s and 
the government’s interpretations of it as reasonable.”). 
 176. United States v. D’Alessio, 822 F. Supp. 1134, 1143 (D.N.J. 1993) (dismissing 
six-count indictment based on vague regulations) (citing Bass, 404 U.S. at 347). 
 177. Bass, 404 U.S. at 348. 
 178. Id. (quoting McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 27 (1931) (Holmes, J.)). 
 179. Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 160 (1990).  Under the well-settled 
canons of statutory construction, courts are deeply reluctant to treat elements of a crime 
as surplusage or “words of no consequence.”  Ratzlaf, 510 U.S. at 140. 
 180. United States v. One Big Six Wheel, 987 F. Supp. 169, 181 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) 
(stating that crime is dependent upon specific distance of gambling activity from U.S. 
shoreline). 
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sanctions, a regulation cannot be construed to mean what an agency 
intended but did not adequately express.”181
The rule of lenity and the doctrine of fair warning have recently been 
invoked by defendants in 2006 to foreclose the government’s attempt in 
a Montana asbestos criminal case to disregard the literal language of the 
asbestos NESHAP and expand the definition of asbestos for purposes of 
a CAA criminal prosecution.182  In W.R. Grace, the government indicted 
a company and seven executives for allegedly putting workers and the 
community of Libby, Montana in danger due to the company’s former 
mine operations, which had closed in approximately 1992.  The indictment 
is based in part on the CAA’s prohibition against knowingly releasing 
“hazardous air pollutants” that place a person in imminent danger of 
death or serious bodily injury under 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c)(5)(A).183  The 
EPA described the Libby mine as “the nation’s biggest environmental 
disaster” and its prosecution as “one of the most significant criminal 
indictments for environmental crime in our history.”184  The Department 
of Justice called the matter a “human and environmental tragedy.”185  
However, the W.R. Grace court ultimately concluded that the government 
was prosecuting conduct that was not regulated. 
The government was forced to admit that the vast majority of the 
asbestos fibers originating from the Libby vermiculite mine (over 90%) 
comprised two forms of fibers that fall outside the six enumerated fibers 
that define asbestos in the NESHAP.186  As in the SDG&E and Harenda 
Enterprises cases, the W.R. Grace defendants sought to hold the 
government to the literal language of the NESHAP for purposes of its 
 181. Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Fed. Mine Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 681 F.2d 
1189, 1193 (9th Cir. 1982) (citing Diamond Roofing Co., Inc. v. Occupational Safety 
and Health Review Comm’n, 528 F.2d 645, 649 (5th Cir. 1976)); Opinion & Order at 6, 
United States v. Apex Oil, No. 95-332-MA (D. Or. Sept. 18, 1996) (“[E]nvironmental 
regulation is sufficiently ambiguous when applied to the facts of this case to justify the 
application of the rule of lenity.”). 
 182. See Order, supra note 24. 
 183. Superseding Indictment, United States v. W.R. Grace, 455 F. Supp. 2d 1122, 
1128 (D. Mont. 2006) (No. CR 05-07-M-DWM), appeal docketed, No. 06-30472 (9th 
Cir. Sept. 5, 2006). 
 184. Andrew Schneider, W.R. Grace Indictment in Libby Asbestos Deaths, SEATTLE 
POST-INTELLIGENCER, Feb. 8, 2005, at A1. 
 185. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, W.R. Grace and Executives Charged with 
Fraud, Obstruction of Justice, and Endangering Libby, Montana Community (Feb. 7, 
2005), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2005/February/05_enrd_048.htm (last 
visited June 4, 2007). 
 186. Order, supra note 24, at 3. 




CAA prosecution.  As the court noted, however, the “government wants 
to ignore the NESHAPs regulations.”187  The government considered the 
six-fiber NESHAP definition of asbestos to be undesirable and 
inconsequential to the scope of its CAA criminal prosecution.188
The government purported to adopt a broader non-NESHAP definition 
of asbestos derived from non-CAA civil cases and regulations for 
purposes of its criminal CAA prosecution.  Citing Supreme Court and 
Ninth Circuit authority, the W.R. Grace court would have none of it.  
The court concluded that “the rule of lenity requires that the law be 
interpreted to cover only conduct that clearly falls within its scope.”189  
The court noted the lack of expert consensus on the basic definition of 
asbestos and the ongoing battle of the experts regarding what forms of 
fibers comprise regulated asbestos.190  The government’s conundrum 
was exacerbated by the fact that it advocated inconsistent definitions of 
asbestos that “fail[] to provide the requisite fair warning about what 
conduct is considered criminal.”191
The court rejected the government’s proposed substitution of a non-
NESHAP definition for asbestos as “ambiguous,” and it applied the rule 
of lenity to bar any evidence or government expert testimony at trial 
based upon government samples containing forms of asbestos fibers not 
clearly within the NESHAP definition.  Because a minority of the 
asbestos at the Libby mine (less than 10%) included “regulated” forms 
of fibers, the case was not dismissed altogether, but significantly altered 
nonetheless.192  The government has appealed that ruling, which is 
pending before the Ninth Circuit.193
The issue of whether and under what circumstances the government 
can expand its jurisdiction to “convert[] some previously lawful conduct 
into crimes” was also tested in One Big Six Wheel and adjudicated 
against the government because of the rule of lenity.194  In that case, the 
government believed a U.S. gambling ship was operating unlawfully in 
territorial waters more than three, but less than twelve, nautical miles 
from the U.S. shoreline and sought the forfeiture of the ship’s gambling 
equipment.195  The Gambling Ship Act (as amended in 1994) authorized 
offshore gambling beyond the “territorial waters” of the U.S., which had 
 187. Id. at 14. 
 188. Id. at 6. 
 189. Id. at 9. 
 190. Id. at 7. 
 191. Id. at 12. 
 192. Id. at 21–23. 
 193. United States v. W.R. Grace, 455 F. Supp. 2d 1122, 1128 (D. Mont. 2006) 
(No. CR 05-07-M-DWM), appeal docketed, No. 06-30472 (9th Cir. Sept. 5, 2006). 
 194. 987 F. Supp. 169, 175 (E.D.N.Y. 1997). 
 195. Id. at 170. 
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been defined by regulation to be three miles from the U.S. shoreline 
since at least 1994.196  A separate and subsequent legislation, the 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, implemented a 
“blanket” statutory twelve-mile limit for U.S. territorial waters.197  The 
company continued to allow ship-based gambling beyond three miles in 
the aftermath of the 1996 statute because twelve miles took too long to 
reach. 
The One Big Six Wheel court noted that the 1996 antiterrorism statute 
did nothing to revoke explicitly the preexisting three-mile regulation for 
gambling cruises, leading to internally inconsistent statutory and regulatory 
definitions of U.S. territorial waters.198  The court reasoned that it would 
not repeal the preexisting three-mile regulation by “implication” and 
construed the jurisdictional ambiguity against the government.199  It 
stated that “[e]ven if the government is correct in its interpretation, the 
path to its conclusion . . . is too serpentine for most readers (including 
this court) to follow with any degree of confidence.”200
The rule of lenity squarely applies to the criminal enforcement of 
environmental regulations.  In United States v. Apex Oil Co., Inc.,201 the 
Ninth Circuit affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of a criminal charge 
because of ambiguity in the environmental regulation’s definition of the 
material prohibited from discharge, “cargo-related oil residues.”  The 
Apex Oil court applied the rule of lenity to uphold the trial court’s 
pretrial dismissal of a count of the indictment alleging conspiracy to 
violate the Act to Prevent Pollution from Ships and its implementing 
regulation at 33 C.F.R. § 151.10(c).  The Ninth Circuit stated that the 
regulation was “not a model of clarity.”202  It held the regulation too 
vaguely defined regarding the precise material prohibited from discharge 
and thus criminally unenforceable.  “In the face of uncertainty as to the 
meaning of what is forbidden, the rule of lenity requires dismissal of 
count one of the indictment.”203
 196. Id. at 171–72. 
 197. Id. at 173. 
 198. Id. at 178. 
 199. Id. at 179 n.11. 
 200. Id. at 179. 
 201. 132 F.3d 1287, 1288 (9th Cir. 1997). 
 202. Id. at 1291. 
 203. Id. 




The applicable regulation in Apex Oil and its foundational definition 
were amended on the heels of the Ninth Circuit’s 1997 ruling.204  In 
SDG&E and W.R. Grace, the government actually sought to render 
vague (broader in scope) what is otherwise clearly enumerated in the 
1990 NESHAP regulation.  The rule of lenity and the related doctrine of 
fair notice prohibit the criminal application of nonbinding test methods. 
The rule of lenity also applies squarely to criminal prosecutions 
involving novel government interpretations of the asbestos NESHAP.205  
In United States v. American National Can Co.,206 the EPA sought $1.4 
million in civil NESHAP fines against the owner of an abandoned 
building that contained pipes and components covered with asbestos.207  
The EPA attempted to expand the application of the asbestos NESHAP 
to building damage caused by trespassers and scavengers.  The EPA 
argued that the building owner had failed to follow the NESHAP work 
practices for renovations and vicariously attributed liability to the 
property owner for the conduct of trespassers and scavengers.  The court 
was so offended by the EPA’s misapplication of the clear language of 
the asbestos NESHAP that it granted the company summary judgment as 
a matter of law and ordered the government to pay the company’s 
attorneys’ fees.208
 204. In a criminal case seven years after Apex involving a cargo ship’s discharge of 
442 metric tons of diesel-contaminated wheat and diesel fuel into the ocean, a Florida 
court declined to dismiss charges under the Act to Prevent Pollution from Ships or apply 
the rule of lenity.  See United States v. Stickle, 355 F. Supp. 2d 1317 (S.D. Fla. 2004).  
Not only had the defective regulation at 33 C.F.R. § 151.10(c) been amended after the 
1997 Apex decision, but the Stickle court held that Apex was “plainly distinguishable” 
and “does not come close to the regulatory issue in this case as to whether diesel fuel and 
diesel-contaminated wheat plainly come within” an entirely different definition and 
provision set forth at 33 C.F.R. § 151.10(a) and not, as in Apex Oil, § 151.10(c).  Id. at 
1337. 
 205. In Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States, the Court upheld the trial court’s 
dismissal of the indictment for alleged asbestos NESHAP work practice violations under 
the rule of lenity, because the EPA’s work practices did not then constitute an emission 
standard, until the CAA was later amended.  434 U.S. 275, 284–85 (1978) (“At the very 
least, it may be said that the issue is subject to some doubt.  Under these circumstances, 
we adhere to the familiar rule that, ‘where there is ambiguity in a criminal statute, doubts 
are resolved in favor of the defendant.’”) (citing United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 348 
(1971)). 
 206. 126 F. Supp. 2d 521 (N.D. Ill. 2000). 
 207. Id. at 523–24. 
 208. Id. at 532; United States v. Am. Nat’l Can Co., No. 98 C 5133, 2001 WL 
13628 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (awarding attorneys’ fees). 
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2.  The Government’s Adoption of the 1993 Test Method in Lieu of the 
1990 Test Method Outside Clean Air Act Rulemaking Expands                   
the Jurisdiction of the Asbestos NESHAP in Violation of                            
Clean Air Act Section 307(d) 
“In 1977, Congress amended the Clean Air Act to provide new 
procedural requirements for EPA rulemaking under the Act, requirements 
that are more stringent than those previously applicable under the 
Administrative Procedure Act.”209  The CAA’s rulemaking requirements 
are deliberately methodical and involve public notice, OMB review, 
agency disclosure of relevant data and policy considerations, public 
comments and agency responses thereto, and, most importantly, judicial 
review.210  The enhanced CAA rulemaking procedures were designed to 
remedy inadequacies noted by Congress in pre-1977 EPA rulemaking 
under the Administrative Procedure Act.211
EPA NESHAP “applicability determinations” or “regulatory interpretations,” 
such as the EPA’s multiple clarifications, are purely interpretative 
guidance and not promulgated rules.212  Indeed, the EPA’s own internal 
guidance disclaims reliance upon any regulatory determinations from the 
EPA staff on the type of activities regulated by the NESHAP.  Such 
interpretations cannot be relied upon by the public, do not bind the 
agency, and can be revised without public notice.213  The EPA issues 
approximately one hundred nonbinding NESHAP determinations per 
year, generally from its ten EPA regional offices’ NESHAP branch 
chiefs.214
CAA section 307(d) defines twenty-two areas where the EPA must 
conform to rulemaking to make policy the law, including NESHAP 
regulations upon which criminal and civil prosecutions like SDG&E and 
Harenda Enterprises can be based.215  It is well established that substantive 
changes to existing CAA rules require rulemaking, while interpretative 
 209. Union Oil Co. of Cal. v. EPA, 821 F.2d 678, 681–82 (D.C. Cir. 1987); see also 
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685 (codified in 
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
 210. 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d) (2000). 
 211. See H.R. REP. NO. 95-294, at 27 (1977). 
 212. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, OFFICE OF ENFORCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE 
ASSURANCE, EPA 305-B-99-004, HOW TO REVIEW AND ISSUE CLEAN AIR ACT, 
APPLICABILITY DETERMINATIONS AND ALTERNATIVE MONITORING (1999). 
 213. Id. at ii (“Disclaimer”). 
 214. Id. at iii (“Executive Summary”), 14. 
 215. 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(1)(C) (2000). 




rules are exempt because they do not impose new duties and are not 
otherwise binding upon the agency or public.216  A substantive change 
includes CAA “test methods” and modifications thereto that expand the 
jurisdictional reach of EPA regulations.217  In fact, the CAA mandates 
that the EPA “may establish, by rule, test measures and other analytic 
procedures.”218  EPA test methods established outside CAA rulemaking, 
such as the 1993 test method, arguably have no legal significance in 
criminal or civil NESHAP prosecutions. 
For example, the Appalachian Power court set aside an EPA guidance 
document that purported to require states issuing CAA permits to 
mandate more extensive air monitoring of facilities in those permits, 
even though such enhanced monitoring was not at all required by federal 
law.219  The court noted the increasing “phenomenon” of creepage of 
agency regulatory “law” without appropriate rulemaking, motivated in 
part to immunize agency actions from judicial review: 
The phenomenon we see in this case is familiar.  Congress passes a broadly 
worded statute.  The agency follows with regulations containing broad language, 
open-ended phrases, ambiguous standards and the like.  Then as years pass, the 
agency issues circulars or guidance or memoranda, explaining, interpreting, 
defining and often expanding the commands in the regulations.  One guidance 
document may yield another and then another and so on.220
EPA test methods (or revisions thereto) that govern CAA compliance 
constitute substantive rules that require rulemaking.221  In Donner Hanna, 
the EPA threatened a coke plant operator with criminal sanctions if it 
did not allow EPA compliance testing at its facility using a nonpromulgated, 
“proposed” test method to measure smoke opacity from its ovens.222  
The plant refused, disputing the reliability of the proposed EPA test 
method and the nonbinding method’s tendency to find a higher 
percentage of opacity violations.223
Consistent with SDG&E and Harenda Enterprises, only one CAA 
opacity test method had been promulgated through rulemaking (adopted 
in 1971 and revised in 1974) to determine the opacity of emissions using 
human observers.  The opacity test method was called “Revised Method 
 216. See Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 208 F.3d 1015, 1020–21 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 
 217. Id. at 1026–27 (stating that CAA test methods “are surely ‘substantive’ 
requirements” that require rulemaking). 
 218. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b)(5) (2000) (emphasis added). 
 219. Appalachian Power, 208 F.3d at 1028. 
 220. Id. at 1020 (striking down EPA guidance document giving states “marching 
orders” to require enhanced monitoring that was not required by federal law). 
 221. Donner Hanna Coke Corp. v. Costle, 464 F. Supp. 1295, 1304 (W.D.N.Y. 
1979). 
 222. Id. at 1298. 
 223. Id. at 1298, 1301 n.6. 
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9.”  However, the EPA did not want to use that enumerated test method 
because Revised Method 9 allowed averaging.224  Instead, in 1975 the 
EPA selected parts of Revised Method 9 and added new procedures to 
cobble together a unique test method specifically for coke ovens.225  
However, the EPA’s recommended test method for coke ovens never 
went through rulemaking, and as here, had no force of law.226  The EPA 
described its new method as merely an “interpretation” of the previously 
promulgated opacity test method.227  Complicating matters, the plant 
operator, the EPA, and even the court found that Revised Method 9 was 
not, in practical terms, appropriate for coke oven operations, where 
smoke emissions are intermittent and not continuous.228  Accordingly, 
there was no serious dispute that the only promulgated opacity test 
method fell short.  Nonetheless, the court held that the government could 
not fill the void with its own nonpromulgated test method. 
The promulgated smoke opacity test method in Donner Hanna 
mandated averaging of twenty-four consecutive readings.  The informal 
EPA test method did not.  The court considered the new EPA test method’s 
rejection of averaging to be significant, as averaging moderates human 
error and reduces the impact of erroneous results.229  As with the asbestos 
NESHAP, the EPA even promised in Donner Hanna to undergo future 
rulemaking in the preamble of its promulgated 1974 test method for 
smoke opacity: “It is EPA’s intent to propose an additional revision to 
Method 9 specifying an alternative method to enforce opacity standards.”230  
In a familiar pattern, EPA never followed through but nonetheless 
sought to invoke criminal sanctions based on a nonbinding test.231
The Donner Hanna court concluded that rulemaking is necessary before 
the EPA’s proposed test method is available to assess CAA compliance.232  
The court noted that rulemaking “produce[s] more objective testing 
methods,” and “[e]nforcement officials cannot circumvent the rulemaking 
requirements of the Clean Air Act by making substantial changes in 
 224. Id. at 1301–02. 
 225. Id. at 1300–02. 
 226. Id. at 1301. 
 227. Id. at 1302. 
 228. Id. at 1302–03. 
 229. Id. at 1303. 
 230. Id. at 1302–03. 
 231. Id. at 1303. 
 232. Id. at 1304. 




testing methods without notice and a hearing.”233  The “significance of 
rulemaking cannot be underemphasized,” such as providing aggrieved 
parties the opportunity of judicial review of those rules agencies intend 
to civilly and criminally enforce.234  The Donner Hanna court stated that 
the EPA’s proposed method “strayed so far from the original substance 
and intent of Method 9 that it in effect created a new and different 
method, not subject to the scrutiny of rulemaking procedures” and is 
therefore inconsequential.235
The criminal case of United States v. Ward 236 is particularly instructive 
on the due process problems of reinterpreting jurisdictional thresholds of 
“regulated” material in the absence of agency rulemaking.  In Ward, 
criminal charges based upon an OSHA regulation were dismissed on a 
pretrial motion because the government purported to demonstrate that 
the material at issue was “regulated” by means and methods outside the 
applicable OSHA regulation itself.  The president of Concept Sciences, 
Inc. (CSI) was indicted following a February 1999 explosion that killed 
five individuals at CSI’s Allentown, Pennsylvania facility.  The facility 
manufactured hydroxylamine, a solvent for the pharmaceutical and 
semiconductor industries.  Hydroxylamine is unstable and explosive in 
highly concentrated form. 
The government charged the company’s president with willfully violating 
OSHA’s “process safety management” regulation, then at 29 C.F.R.       
§ 1910.119 (OSHA PSM Regulation).  The defendant, as in SDG&E and 
Harenda Enterprises, argued that the OSHA PSM Regulation did not 
apply to the company’s hydroxylamine process because the material at 
issue was below the “threshold quantity at which the [OSHA] Regulation 
would apply” and the criminal application of the regulation “violates the 
rulemaking requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 
§ 552, et seq.”237
 233. Id. at 1305. 
 234. Id. 
 235. Id.  In Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, the Fifth Circuit invalidated a 
comprehensive asbestos regulation ten years in the making that banned asbestos 
commercial products under TSCA.  947 F.2d 1201, 1212–13 (5th Cir. 1991).  The court 
found EPA had changed its “methodology” outside the formal rulemaking process that 
effectively bootstrapped and enhanced the purported benefits of the asbestos ban.  Id. 
(“In summary, on an issue of this import, the EPA should have announced during the 
years in which the hearings were ongoing, rather than the subsequent weeks after which 
they were closed, that it intended to use [the different methodology].”).  The court 
further held that a change in methodology outside the formal rulemaking process proved 
fatal to ten years of EPA asbestos rulemaking, reasoning that the EPA cannot deviate 
from rulemaking requirements to reach a “desired result.”  Id. at 1230. 
 236. United States v. Ward, No. CRIM.00-681, 2001 WL 1160168 (E.D. Pa. 2001). 
 237. Id. at *1. 
HOWARD.DOC 8/16/2007  9:40:19 AM 
[VOL. 44:  173, 2007]  EPA’s Prosecution of Clean Air Act  
  SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
 221 
 
In Ward, the OSHA PSM Regulation applied to any process that involved 
a listed chemical (for example, hydroxylamine) at or above a specified 
threshold quantity.238  The OSHA threshold quantity for hydroxylamine 
was defined in the applicable regulation to be 2500 pounds.239  However, 
the OSHA PSM Regulation failed to address the issue of whether the 
regulation applied to dilute forms of hydroxylamine.240  The indictment 
alleged 3520 pounds of hydroxylamine, but without any adjustment for 
the amount of chemical dilution at the time of the CSI explosion.241  The 
highest hydroxylamine concentration at the defendant’s plant was a 
50% aqueous solution, which potentially reduced the amount of actual 
hydroxylamine to 1760 pounds (one half of 3520 pounds, and potentially 
below the 2500-pound OSHA regulation threshold) at the time of 
explosion.242  CSI’s indicted company president argued that the regulation 
plainly applied only to 100% pure hydroxylamine, and the indictment 
erroneously represented that the potentially explosive dilute 50% mixture is 
“regulated.” 
The Ward court attempted to address three issues: 
(1)  Whether the OSHA PSM Regulation applies to defendant’s dilute 
form of 50% hydroxylamine; 
(2)  Whether defendant’s hydroxylamine process exceeded the OSHA 
PSM Regulation’s threshold requirements to be “regulated” 
material; 
(3) Whether OSHA was required to follow the rulemaking procedures 
of the Administrative Procedure Act before its interpretations 
of the OSHA PSM Regulation “could be enforced in a criminal 
case.”243
The court held that the OSHA PSM Regulation was too ambiguous to 
answer the first two questions regarding the chemical’s jurisdictional 
threshold in the government’s favor, and that the government’s criminal 
enforcement of its own subsequent “interpretations” of the regulation to 
demonstrate jurisdiction violated the Administrative Procedure Act.244
 238. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.119(a)(1)(i) (2006). 
 239. 29 C.F.R. app. A, § 1910.119 (2006). 
 240. Ward, 2001 WL 1160168, at *3. 
 241. Id. 
 242. Id. at *10. 
 243. Id. at *3–*4. 
 244. Id. at *23. 




The government conceded that 50% hydroxylamine was not specifically 
listed in the OSHA PSM Regulation but urged the Ward court to defer to 
OSHA’s subsequent and more generous interpretations (or clarifications) 
of its own regulation.245  The court rejected the government’s argument, 
stating that “courts should not defer to an agency’s informal interpretation 
of an ambiguous statute or regulation in a criminal case.”246  The court 
relied upon the Ninth Circuit’s Apex Oil decision to conclude that “strict 
construction of promulgated rules and regulations is required when 
implicated in a criminal case.”247  Where the required analytical method 
is actually enumerated in the regulation, but the government nonetheless 
disregards that test method as inconsequential, no deference is warranted 
at all.248
In Ward, the agency tried to bootstrap its criminal prosecution on the 
weight of interpretative guidance purporting to expand the regulation to 
encompass dilute forms of hydroxylamine.  The Ward court concluded 
that the basic principles of administrative law and rulemaking prohibited 
the application of OSHA’s informal interpretations in a criminal case 
and dismissed the indictment.249
In another case, the EPA unsuccessfully attempted to expand the asbestos 
NESHAP’s definition of renovation outside rulemaking in a civil matter 
to include damage arising from unlawful activity—specifically trespassing 
and scavenging.250  The court reasoned that, even under the deferential 
Chevron standard251 for agency interpretations of regulations reserved 
for noncriminal civil or administrative matters, the EPA “has gone too 
far.”252  The court held the proposed EPA reinterpretation of the NESHAP 
was barred by basic administrative rulemaking obligations. 
The EPA cannot escape the strictures of the notice-and-comment process by 
cloaking a substantive addition to the asbestos NESHAP (such as regulating 
scavenging) in the guise of a mere interpretation of an extant regulation. . . .  By 
interpreting “renovation” to include unauthorized scavenging, the EPA attempts 
to broaden the scope of the asbestos NESHAP in a substantive manner without 
 245. Id. at *3. 
 246. Id. at *8. 
 247. Id. at *10 (citing United States v. Apex Oil Co., Inc., 132 F.3d 1287 (9th Cir. 
1997)). 
 248. Id. at *9 n.5 (“[D]eference is warranted only when the language of the 
regulation is ambiguous.”) (citing Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 588 
(2000)). 
 249. Id. at *1, *23. 
 250. United States v. Am. Nat’l Can Co., 126 F. Supp. 2d 521, 523–24 (N.D. Ill. 
2000). 
 251. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 
(1984) (providing that courts may defer to agency interpretations of vague aspects of 
agency regulations where civil or criminal liability is not at issue). 
 252. Am. Nat’l Can Co., 126 F. Supp. at 530 n.8. 
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engaging in notice and comment rulemaking, and thereby violates a basic canon 
of administrative law.253
Cases such as Ward, W.R. Grace, Apex Oil, Adamo Wrecking, Donner 
Hanna, Corrosion Proof Fittings, American National Can and Owens 
Contracting consistently instruct that the government’s reinterpretation 
and jurisdictional expansion of its own regulations, such as the asbestos 
NESHAP, must undergo rulemaking to be civilly or criminally enforceable. 
V.  CONCLUSIONS 
It is not the 1990 NESHAP regulation as currently written that bears 
blame for the government’s enforcement transgressions.  Rather, it is the 
EPA’s calculated departure from that enumerated 1990 NESHAP regulation 
for purposes of unilaterally expanding its criminal and civil enforcement 
jurisdiction that renders the EPA, the State of Wisconsin, and similar 
enforcement programs constitutionally unsustainable.  Well-settled canons 
of strict construction, coupled with the rule of lenity and doctrine of fair 
warning, instruct that criminal prosecutions and civil enforcement actions 
must rest upon the bright-line jurisdictional test method set forth in the 
applicable CAA regulations.  In 2006, two courts held that CAA test methods 
implicate important due process rights that only administrative rulemaking 
can cure.  In the absence of rulemaking, long-held EPA assumptions 
about the use of new and nonbinding test methods are now being 
rejected in court.  Cases such as SDG&E and Harenda Enterprises are 
 253. Id. at 530.  In United States v. Owens Contracting Services, Inc., the court 
granted summary judgment in favor of a project’s demolition contractor and against the 
government because the EPA attempted to expand the NESHAP regulation to include 
nonfriable materials not regulated at the time of demolition by the pre-1990 NESHAP.  
844 F. Supp. 1095, 1105 (E.D. Mich. 1994).  The government offered interpretative 
guidance prepared after the 1990 NESHAP amendments in support of its broad 
application of the regulation to nonfriable material.  The court stated that the EPA’s “decision 
to expand the coverage of the asbestos NESHAP to address issues unanticipated at the 
time of promulgation, i.e., nonfriable asbestos which becomes friable or has the potential 
to become friable is, in kindest terms, creative.  Less charitably, it could be an example 
of bureaucratic arrogance.”  Id. 
The NESHAP was eventually amended in 1990 to encompass presently nonfriable 
material at issue in Owens Contracting.  However, before such 1990 rulemaking, the 
application of the EPA’s interpretations to reverse engineer the jurisdictional reach of the 
regulation “would stand as anathema to the requirement that administrative rules be 
properly promulgated so that notice of the rules is given prior to meting out punishment 
for their transgression.”  Id. at 1106.  The Owens Contracting court rejected the 
government’s “substitution of new law for old law that was reasonably clear” through 
the “guise of ‘clarification’ of pre-existing rules.”  Id. 
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forcing EPA to come to grips with the reality that agency policy cannot 
outpace the APA and its own rulemaking obligations. 
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APPENDIX A 
DATE LEGISLATIVE AND REGULATORY HISTORY OF 
ASBESTOS NESHAP & EPA TEST METHODS 
Dec. 31, 1970 Congress amends CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7412, requiring the 
EPA to list “hazardous air pollutants” and develop 
national “emission standards.” 
Mar. 31, 1971 The EPA publishes its first three “hazardous air 
pollutants”: asbestos, beryllium, and mercury.  36 Fed. 
Reg. 5931 (Mar. 31, 1971). 
Dec. 7, 1971 Proposed rule for asbestos National Emission Standards 
for Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAP).  36 Fed. Reg. 
23,239 (Dec. 7, 1971). 
Apr. 6, 1973 National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants 
(NESHAP) for asbestos promulgated at 40 C.F.R. 61, 
subpart B under the CAA.  Asbestos content based upon 
percentage based on “dry weight” in material; no 
standardized test method adopted to determine 
quantitatively the content of asbestos in a material based 
on dry weight.  38 Fed. Reg. 8835 (Apr. 6, 1973). 
Oct. 14, 1975 The asbestos NESHAP is amended to add the definition 
for “friable asbestos-containing material” and specify a 
minimum content of “more than 1 percent by weight.”  No 
analytical method specified.  40 Fed. Reg. 48,292, 
48,299–302 (Oct. 14, 1975). 
HOWARD.DOC 8/16/2007  9:40:19 AM 
 
226 
DATE LEGISLATIVE AND REGULATORY HISTORY OF 
ASBESTOS NESHAP & EPA TEST METHODS 
May 27, 1982 Adoption into law under TSCA of test method that would 
ultimately become 1990 test method.  “Interim Method of 
the Determination of Asbestos in Bulk Insulation 
Samples” promulgated at Appendix A at 40 C.F.R. part 
763 under TSCA Section 6(a)(3) and Asbestos School 
Hazard Detection and Control Act of 1980 regarding 
asbestos in schools.  Regulation addresses asbestos in 
school buildings.  Test method requires multi-strata 
analysis and averaging of all strata of material.  Asbestos; 
Friable Asbestos-Containing Materials in Schools; 
Identification and Notification, 47 Fed. Reg. 23,360, 
23,370, 23,377 § 1.7.2.1 (May 27, 1982).  
Dec. 1982 The EPA’s Environmental Monitoring Systems 
Laboratory publishes the “Interim Method for the 
Determination of Asbestos in Bulk Insulation Samples” 
(EPA-600/M4-82-020).  This is a Polarized Light 
Microscopy (PLM) method that requires 400 point 
counting and combining the results of each layer of 
multilayered material to yield an estimate of asbestos 
content for the whole material.  Visual area estimation is 
not an option in this version. 
Apr. 5, 1984 The asbestos NESHAP repromulgated by the EPA after 
Supreme Court in Adamo Wrecking invalidates “work 
practice” requirements as not authorized by 1970 CAA 
and its “emission standards” requirement.  The 1984 
NESHAP amendments do not specify an analytical 
method to determine material that contains “more than 1 
percent asbestos by weight.”  National Emission 
Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants; Amendments to 
Asbestos Standard, 49 Fed. Reg. 13,658, 13,658 (Apr. 5, 
1984). 
Oct. 1986 Congress enacts Asbestos Hazard Emergency Response 
Act (AHERA) for schools, amending the Toxic 
Substances Control Act (TSCA).  15 U.S.C. §§ 2641–
2656 (2000). 
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DATE LEGISLATIVE AND REGULATORY HISTORY OF 
ASBESTOS NESHAP & EPA TEST METHODS 
Oct. 30, 1987 Asbestos Hazard Emergency Response Act (AHERA) 
regulations promulgated at 40 C.F.R. 763, subpart E under 
the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA).  Appendix E 
to AHERA adopts 1990 test method (1982 TSCA test 
method) requiring PLM by 400 point count and 
combining the results of each layer of multilayered bulk 
samples to yield an estimate of asbestos content for whole 
material. 
Nov. 20, 1990 The asbestos NESHAP is amended to revoke “1 percent 
by weight” standard in effect since 1973 and specify new 
“area test” of 1 percent as determined by 1982 TSCA and 
1987 AHERA test method (“Interim Method for the 
Determination of Asbestos in Bulk Insulation Samples,” 
set forth at TSCA’s regulations for AHERA, 40 C.F.R. 
763, subpart E).  The EPA also defines Category I and 
Category II materials, with Category I materials to remain 
in place during demolition because of low risk of 
releasing fibers.  National Emission Standards for 
Hazardous Air Pollutants; Asbestos NESHAP Provision, 
55 Fed. Reg. 48,406, 48,410, 48,415 (Nov. 20, 1990). 
July 1993 The EPA Atmospheric Research and Exposure 
Assessment Laboratory publishes the “Method for the 
Determination of Asbestos in Bulk Building Materials” 
(EPA/600/R-93/116).  This PLM test method contains 
“significant revisions” to procedures outlined in the 1990 
test method, including visual estimation techniques and 
delayering of nonseparable layers in multilayered systems.   
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DATE LEGISLATIVE AND REGULATORY HISTORY OF 
ASBESTOS NESHAP & EPA TEST METHODS 
Jan. 5, 1994 The EPA’s first clarification in response to “many 
questions about analyzing multi-layered systems.”  The 
“clarification does not supersede, alter, or in any way 
replace the existing asbestos NESHAP.”  In general, when 
a sample consists of two or more layers or materials, the 
EPA advises that each layer should be treated separately 
and the results reported by layer (discrete stratum).  The 
one exception is for wallboards (that is, joint compound, 
joint tape, and wallboard), when a multi-strata composite 
average should be conducted.  The EPA excludes 
wallboard systems from a layer-by-layer analysis on the 
grounds that it “in effect becomes one material.”  
Asbestos NESHAP Clarification Regarding Analysis of 
Multi-layered Systems, 59 Fed. Reg. 542, 542 (Jan. 5, 
1994). 
Aug. 1994 NVLAP “Bulk Asbestos Analysis” NIST Handbook 150-3 
(Aug. 1994) requiring laboratory compliance to 1990 test 
method or current EPA 1993 test method, but laboratories 
“responsible for ensuring it implements the latest revision 
of the method.”   
Aug. 1, 1994 EPA advisory of availability of “improved” 1993 asbestos 
bulk sample test method, “Method for the Determination 
of Asbestos in Bulk Building Materials” (EPA/600/R-
93/116).  The EPA directs laboratories to follow the 
“preferred substitute method” and delayer multilayered 
systems.  The EPA acknowledges that there is no 
modification of the governing regulations and test results 
following the 1990 test method.  Advisory Regarding 
Availability of an Improved Asbestos Bulk Sample 
Analysis Test Method; Supplementary Information on 
Bulk Sample Collection and Analysis, 59 Fed. Reg. 
38,970, 38,971 (Aug. 1, 1994). 
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DATE LEGISLATIVE AND REGULATORY HISTORY OF 
ASBESTOS NESHAP & EPA TEST METHODS 
Dec. 19, 1995 The EPA’s second clarification regarding analysis of 
multilayered systems.  It states the EPA’s “unwritten 
policy” has been to require delayering and “no averaging 
or dilution” by combining the results of all strata.  The 
EPA states that the 1990 test method requires a combined 
result for all layers, which contradicts the EPA’s 
unwritten policy.  The EPA finds the 1993 test method 
(EPA/600/R-93/116) an acceptable alternative method to 
the 1990 test method at Appendix E of AHERA.  “EPA 
intends to amend the asbestos NESHAP in the near future 
to refer specifically to these procedures.”  Asbestos 
NESHAP Clarification Regarding Analysis of Multi-
Layered Systems, 60 Fed. Reg. 65,243, 65,243 (Dec.19, 
1995). 
Dec. 19, 1995 
to Present 
Despite two EPA clarifications to the 1990 test method 
and multilayered systems since adoption on November 20, 
1990, there have been no amendments (or proposed 
amendments) to the asbestos NESHAP to adopt the 1993 
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